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WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CANADA 
Kent Roach*† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An awareness of the alarming reality of wrongful convictions in both 
Canada and other criminal justice systems led the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 2001 to overturn prior jurisprudence that allowed Canada to 
extradite fugitives to face the death penalty.1 The Court decided that 
extradition to face the death penalty would generally violate the 
principles of fundamental justice in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.2 The Court stressed that DNA would not be available in all 
cases,3 and that even “a fair trial does not always guarantee a safe 
verdict.”4 This case presents a challenge to all courts and policy-makers 
to do better in responding to the risk of wrongful convictions.5 It is also 
a reminder that all criminal justice systems that use the death penalty run 
an unacceptable risk of executing an innocent person. 
Another measure of the recognition of the reality of wrongful 
 
 * Professor of Law and Prichard-Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of 
Toronto. I thank the organizers of the 2011 Innocence Project Annual Conference for inviting me to 
speak at that conference where a preliminary version of this paper was given. The financial assistance of 
Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. 
 † This article is being published as part of a symposium that took place in April 2011 in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, hosted by the Ohio Innocence Project, entitled The 2011 Innocence Network 
Conference: An International Exploration of Wrongful Conviction. Funding for the symposium was 
provided by The Murray and Agnes Seasongood Good Government Foundation. The articles appearing 
in this symposium range from formal law review style articles to transcripts of speeches that were given 
by the author at the symposium. Therefore, the articles published in this symposium may not comply 
with all standards set forth in Texas Law Review and the Bluebook. 
 1. United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7(Can.). Before this decision, Canada had extradited 
fugitives to face the death penalty in the United States. See Re Ng, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (Can.); Re 
Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (Can.). Note that all Supreme Court of Canada decisions are available at 
http://scc.lexum.org/en/index.html. 
 2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 § 7 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. app. II, no. 44 (Can.). 
 3. The Court noted that many miscarriages of justice revealed by the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission in England and Wales did not depend on DNA testing and concluded, “[T]hese cases 
demonstrate that the concern about wrongful convictions is unlikely to be resolved by advances in 
forensic sciences, welcome as these advances are from the perspective of protecting the innocent and 
punishing the guilty.” Burns, 2001 SCC 7, at ¶¶ 116. 
 4. Id. at 98. In reference to the David Milgaard case, the Supreme Court stated: “Milgaard was 
represented by able and experienced counsel. No serious error in law or procedure occurred at the trial. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the conviction for murder followed a fair trial, new evidence surfaced 
years later.” 
 5. See Kent Roach, The Protection of Innocence Under Section 7 of the Charter, 34 SUP. CT. L. 
REV. 249 (2006) for a detailed critical evaluation of the Court’s performance on various innocence 
issues. 
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convictions is that since 1986, provincial governments in Canada have 
made discretionary decisions to call seven different public inquiries into 
notorious wrongful convictions.6 The findings and recommendations of 
these commissions of inquiry provide a unique and important source of 
information about Canadian wrongful convictions. They also provide a 
partially implemented reform agenda to prevent wrongful convictions. 
The federal government in Canada has unfortunately been resistant to 
implementing the recommendations of the provincial inquiries into 
wrongful convictions, even though criminal law and procedure is 
exclusively a matter of federal jurisdiction in Canada. 
Canada has a legal system that is similar to the United States, with a 
constitutional bill of rights enforced through an adversarial system. On 
the other hand, the Canadian system is staffed only by appointed judges 
and prosecutors, and has much more centralized policing and forensic 
science systems than in the U.S. The Canadian system has wide rights of 
appeal and generous tests for the admission of fresh evidence. It has 
many similarities to the British system. Canada, like Australia, however, 
retains a system where petitions to re-open cases after appeals have been 
exhausted must be granted by elected politicians, unlike the independent 
commission in England and Wales. 
The first part of this Essay will examine what is known about the 
number of wrongful convictions in Canada. Much depends on the 
somewhat murky definition of a wrongful conviction. Even if there was 
agreement about such a definition, the ultimate number of wrongful 
convictions is unknowable, given that efforts to discover wrongful 
convictions in Canada, as in the United States, have been focused on the 
most serious cases, namely those involving homicide and sexual assault, 
or both. That said, the Canadian experience is of interest because in 
recent years an increasing number of wrongful convictions arising from 
 
 6. ROYAL COMM’N ON THE DONALD MARSHALL JR. PROSECUTION, DIGEST OF FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (1989) [hereinafter MARSHALL INQUIRY]; COMM’N ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING 
GUY PAUL MORIN, REPORT (1998) [hereinafter MORIN INQUIRY]; MANITOBA JUSTICE, INQUIRY 
REGARDING THOMAS SOPHONOW (2001) [hereinafter SOPHONOW INQUIRY]; ANTONIO LAMER, LAMER 
COMM’N OF INQUIRY PERTAINING TO THE CASES OF RONALD DALTON, GREGORY PARSONS AND 
RANDY DRUKEN, REPORT AND ANNEXES (2006) [hereinafter LAMER INQUIRY]; PATRICK J. LESAGE, 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF 
JAMES DRISKELL (2007) [hereinafter DRISKELL INQUIRY]; EDWARD P. MACCALLUM, REPORT OF THE 
INQUIRY INTO THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF DAVID MILGAARD (2008) [hereinafter MILGAARD 
INQUIRY]; STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 
(2008) [hereinafter GOUDGE INQUIRY]. Most of the reports of these inquiries are available on the 
internet. On the Canadian inquiries see Kathryn Campbell, Policy Responses to Wrongful Conviction in 
Canada: the Role of Conviction Review, Public Inquiries and Compensation, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 145 
(2005); Kent Roach, Inquiries and the Processes of Accountability, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 268, 268–93 (Stenning ed. 1995). Some of the Canadian inquiries have attracted international 
attention. See, for example, ST. OF ILL., REPORT OF GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (2002), which relied heavily on the Canadian Morin Inquiry. 
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guilty pleas have been discovered. This phenomenon suggests that the 
unknown number of wrongful convictions may be much larger than 
many have appreciated. In other words, wrongful convictions may result 
not only from contested trials, but from the majority of cases in which 
accused plead guilty. 
The next part of this Essay will explore two case studies of wrongful 
convictions to provide an overview of the main causes of wrongful 
convictions, as well as the two main legal mechanisms for overturning 
wrongful convictions. The first case study is the Donald Marshall Jr. 
case. Marshall was as a young Aboriginal man from Nova Scotia, 
imprisoned eleven years for a murder he did not commit. The Marshall 
case was the subject of the first public inquiry into a wrongful 
conviction in Canada. The inquiry first raised awareness about wrongful 
convictions and it also made important recommendations about how to 
prevent them in the future. The second case study will examine the case 
of Tammy Marquardt, a young single mother from Ontario who was 
imprisoned for thirteen years for the murder of her two and one-half 
year old son, on the basis of erroneous forensic pathology expert 
testimony that the cause of her son’s death was asphyxia.  
These two case studies illustrate the two main ways that wrongful 
convictions are revealed in Canada. Marshall’s murder conviction was 
overturned after the federal Minister of Justice granted his petition for a 
new appeal on the basis of fresh evidence and after Marshall had 
exhausted appeals all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Marquardt’s wrongful conviction was overturned when the Supreme 
Court of Canada granted her leave to make a late and normally out of 
time appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ontario court 
of appeal. The court of appeal then held that the murder conviction was 
a miscarriage of justice, in light of new forensic pathology evidence that 
the cause of death was not asphyxia but unascertained. A new trial was 
ordered, but the prosecutor withdrew charges and the trial judge 
apologized for what happened to Marquardt.  
The two case studies demonstrate some of the strengths of the 
Canadian system in recognizing wrongful convictions, including a fairly 
liberal approach to late appeals, the availability of bail pending appeal, 
the reception of a wide range of fresh evidence, and the willingness of 
Canada’s unelected prosecutors at times to agree to the reversal of 
convictions on the basis of new evidence. At the same time, an 
important weakness of the Canadian approach to reversing wrongful 
conviction is the maintenance of a system in which an elected politician, 
the federal Minister of Justice, has responsibility for re-opening cases 
after appeals have been exhausted. The slow, adversarial and risk 
adverse nature of this petition procedure will be examined. The federal 
3
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government has refused to implement recommendations made by six 
different public inquiries that an independent body patterned after the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) for England and Wales be 
created. Another weakness the two case studies reveal is the haphazard 
Canadian approach to the recognition of and compensation for wrongful 
convictions. Compensation for wrongful convictions in Canada is 
formally based on factual innocence, but there is no legal mechanism for 
determining factual innocence. 
Having examined the strengths and weaknesses of the legal 
mechanisms for overturning wrongful convictions, this Essay will 
examine the main causes of wrongful convictions and the role that 
police, prosecutors, defence counsel, judges, and juries play in wrongful 
convictions. The most important reform to prevent wrongful convictions 
is likely the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1991 recognition of a broad 
constitutional right of the accused to disclosure of all relevant 
information the prosecution possesses.7 Many pre-1991 wrongful 
convictions in Canada might have been prevented had such broad rights 
of disclosure been respected.8 The Court’s decision was inspired by the 
vision of the prosecutor as an official concerned with ensuring justice, 
rather than winning. It also responded to the refusal of the federal 
government to amend the Criminal Code to require disclosure as 
recommended by the commission of inquiry into Marshall’s wrongful 
conviction. 
The role of the police in wrongful convictions will be examined, with 
attention to the findings of various inquiries about tunnel vision. The 
failure of the Criminal Code to regulate police interrogation and 
identification procedures will be critically examined. Although the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the dangers of false confessions 
should influence the admissibility of confessions,9 there are limits to 
judicial regulation of interrogation procedures. For example, Canadian 
courts continue to allow testimony from jailhouse informers,10 and allow 
prolonged stings and interrogations of vulnerable suspects that create 
risks of false confessions.11 The courts also allow eyewitness 
 
 7. R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (Can.). 
 8. For examples of “historical” wrongful convictions that might have been prevented by full 
disclosure see Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575 (Can.) (overturning 1959 murder conviction in part on the 
basis of undisclosed material); Re Walsh, 2008 NBCA 33 (Can.) (overturning 1975 murder conviction 
in part on the basis of undisclosed material); Re Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202 (Can.) (overturning 1972 
murder conviction in part on the basis of undisclosed material); R. v. Henry, 2010 BCCA 462 (Can.) 
(describing 1983 sexual assault convictions that were overturned in part on the basis of undisclosed 
material). Note that many of these decisions are available at http://www.canlii.org/en/. 
 9. R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38 (Can.). 
 10. R. v. Brooks, 2000 SCC 11 (Can.); R. v. Hurley, 2010 SCC 18 (Can.). 
 11. R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48 (Can.); R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11 (Can.); R. v. Grandinetti, 205 
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identifications to be made despite improprieties in obtaining such 
identifications12 and concerns about the lack of probative value of 
courtroom identifications.13 The courts allow police to be civilly sued 
for negligent investigations, but the absence of established standards 
makes it difficult to establish police negligence.14 The Parliament of 
Canada has jurisdiction over all criminal law and procedure throughout 
Canada, but has unfortunately failed to regulate police interrogation and 
identification procedures.  
Forensic evidence has played a role in many Canadian wrongful 
convictions and the findings of various inquiries and related judicial 
decisions will be examined. In 2007, the Supreme Court held in a 4–3 
decision that post-hypnosis identifications should not be admitted, 
because of their unknown reliability and the risk of wrongful 
convictions.15 This decision presents a potential for Canadian courts to 
place stricter reliability-based restrictions on the admissibility of expert 
evidence, including unreliable forensic evidence. At the same time, 
various inquiries have made many important recommendations about 
reforming the practice of the forensic sciences. Many of these 
recommendations have been implemented, though the tendency has 
been to do so on a discipline-by-discipline basis in particular 
provinces.16  
The Essay will also explore the role of defence lawyers in Canadian 
wrongful convictions. Canada’s constitutional standard of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, based on Strickland v. Washington,17 is not 
particularly effective in reducing the risk of wrongful convictions. 
Canada has remained too wedded to restrictive rules of jury secrecy, 
despite some evidence that jurors have contributed to wrongful 
convictions.18 The Essay will also examine the role of judges in 
wrongful convictions, including the performance of appeal courts in 
Canada and their refusal to adopt a “lurking doubt” standard for 
reversing convictions.19 
The last part of this Essay will examine compensation for the 
wrongfully convicted, including the steps that Canada has taken to 
comply with Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
 
SCC 5 (Can.); R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 (Can.). 
 12. Mezzo v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802 (Can.). 
 13. R. v. Hibbert, 2002 SCC 39 (Can.). 
 14. Hill v. Hamilton Wentworth Police, 2007 SCC 41 (Can.). 
 15. R. v. Trochym, 2007 SCC 6 (Can.). 
 16. Although criminal law and procedure is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction in Canada, 
the administration of justice is subject to provincial jurisdiction. 
 17. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) followed in R. v. G.D.B., 2000 SCC 22 (Can.). 
 18. R. v. Pan, 2001 SCC 42 (Can.). 
 19. R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15(Can.); R. v. W.H. 2013 SCC 22. 
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Political Rights with respect to compensation. There is no statute 
governing compensation and restrictive administrative guidelines are 
often ignored in practice. Although Canadian governments formally 
require factual innocence for compensation, there is no legal mechanism 
for establishing factual innocence in Canada. 
II. THE NUMBER OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CANADA 
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the number of 
wrongful convictions in Canada. One reason is ambiguity about what 
constitutes a wrongful conviction.20 Another reason is an unwillingness 
of the legal system to make determinations of innocence. Yet another 
reason is that there is simply no way to determine how many wrongful 
convictions occur, but remain undetected. 
Most recognized wrongful convictions in Canada, as in the United 
States,21 arise in homicide or sexual assault cases, even though these 
cases constitute only a small percentage of all criminal cases and 
convictions. These identified wrongful convictions may be the 
proverbial tip of the iceberg in the wider universe of criminal cases. 
Such concerns have increased in Canada, because a number of recently 
 
 20. Wrongful convictions especially in the context of DNA exonerations and public and media 
discourse are sometimes limited to those who have been proven to be factually innocent. See BARRY 
SCHECK, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2001). In many cases, however, it may not be possible to make 
definitive conclusions about factual innocence. In British-influenced systems, the term miscarriage of 
justice includes not only the conviction of the innocent, but convictions that are improper and 
overturned on appeal. For various approaches to the definitional issue see Clive Walker, Miscarriages of 
Justice in Principle and Practice, in JUSTICE IN ERROR 37 (Walker and Starmer eds., 1993) (containing 
a broad definition of miscarriage of justice by including rights violations and detention under unjust 
laws); MICHAEL NAUGHTON, RETHINKING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE BEYOND THE TIP OF THE 
ICEBERG (2007) (explaining that miscarriages of justice are broadly defined to include all successful 
appeals); Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror, 109 PENN. ST. 
L. REV. 967 (2005) (containing a narrower definition of miscarriage of justice to include those who 
should not be detained under the liability rules of the relevant legislation); Michael Naughton, The 
Importance of Innocence for the Criminal Justice System, in CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, HOPE 
FOR THE INNOCENT? 31 (Naughton ed., 2010) (focusing on claims of “factual innocence”). This Essay 
will not enter into this important definitional debate but will, consistent with Canadian legal practice, 
define wrongful convictions somewhat more broadly than cases of proven factual innocence given the 
difficulty and impossibility of establishing factual innocence in many cases lacking DNA evidence as 
well as the reluctance of the Canadian system to make determinations of factual innocence. See Re 
Milgaard, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 875 (Can.); Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575 (Can.) (examples of courts not 
finding innocence in cases widely accepted as convictions of the innocent); Re Mullins-Johnson, 2007 
ONCA 720 (Can.) (a criminal appeal court determining it had no jurisdiction to make determinations of 
“factual” innocence). 
 21. Samuel Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005) (4% of exonerations in cases that did not involve murder or rape); SAMUEL 
GROSS AND MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989-2012: REPORT BY THE 
NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 18. available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf (18% of exonerations in cases that 
did not involve murder or rape). 
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revealed wrongful convictions stem from cases where the accused 
pleaded guilty.22 The fact that those who plead guilty may be innocent 
suggests that the potential pool of the wrongfully convicted has 
increased from those who are tried and convicted to the much larger 
numbers who decide to plead guilty. Defendants often plead guilty in 
response to incentives such as reduced sentences that the state offers. 
They also plead guilty because of the practical difficulties of defending 
oneself against the state’s much greater resources. 
The criminal justice system in Canada does not generally recognize 
factual innocence. There is also no consistent definition of what 
constitutes a wrongful conviction. Canadian appellate courts can 
overturn convictions on a number of grounds, including not only error of 
law, but also that the guilty verdict is unreasonable, that it cannot be 
supported by the evidence, or that “on any ground there was a 
miscarriage of justice.”23 In addition, the Minister of Justice can re-open 
convictions after appeals have been exhausted on the ground that “there 
is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice likely 
occurred.”24  
The term miscarriage of justice is not defined in legislation, but has 
been broadly defined by courts to include cases 
where there was no unfairness at trial, but evidence was admitted on 
appeal that placed the reliability of the conviction in serious doubt. In 
these cases, the miscarriage of justice lies not in the conduct of the trial or 
even the conviction as entered at trial, but rather in maintaining the 
conviction in the face of new evidence that renders the conviction 
factually unreliable.25 
Miscarriages of justice are not limited to cases of proven or factual 
innocence, and include both cases where there have been unfair trials or 
the reliability of the conviction is in serious doubt. Justice Kaufman, in 
an important report advising the Minister of Justice whether to re-open a 
conviction, has stressed that a miscarriage of justice would occur either 
if an innocent person was convicted or if new evidence could reasonably 
 
 22. R. v. Marshall, 2005 QCCA 852 (Can.) (explaining a case where a mentally disabled person 
who was falsely accused confessed and pleaded guilty to sexual assault, but was later exonerated by 
subsequent DNA evidence); R. v. Hanemaayer, 2008 ONCA 580 (Can.) (explaining a case in which the 
conviction of an innocent person for breaking and entering, and committing assault and assault with 
threatening to use a weapon was overturned after a guilty plea had been entered); R. v. Sheratt 
Robinson, 2009 ONCA 886 (Can.); R. v. C.F., 2010 ONCA 691; R. v. C.M., 2010 ONCA 690 (Can.); 
R. v. Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120 (Can.); R. v. Brant, 2011 ONCA 362 (Can.) (describing cases where 
parents pled guilty to reduced homicide in their child’s death in the face of forensic pathology evidence 
later shown to be unreliable). 
 23. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.686(1). 
 24. Id. s.696.3(3)(a). 
 25. Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575, ¶ 110 (Can.). 
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have affected the verdict. In the latter circumstances, “it would be unfair 
to maintain the accused’s conviction without an opportunity for the trier 
of fact to consider new evidence.”26 Thus convictions in Canada can be 
both re-opened and quashed on grounds short of proven innocence. This 
is a strength of the Canadian system, given the practical difficulties of 
establishing innocence in a definitive manner. 
The issue of what constitutes a wrongful conviction in Canada is 
further complicated because appeal courts have decided that they lack 
statutory jurisdiction to make findings and declarations of factual 
innocence.27 At the same time, however, they do make findings of 
miscarriages of justice, sometimes describe cases as wrongful 
convictions, and have made apologies to the accused in cases where 
long standing convictions have been overturned on the basis of new 
evidence and where the innocence of the person is generally accepted in 
the media and elsewhere.28 Canadian appellate courts also enter 
acquittals, as opposed to ordering new trials, in cases where they are 
convinced that no reasonable jury could convict29 and also in old cases 
where they conclude that the accused would probably be acquitted at a 
hypothetical new trial.30 
Not all those who are recognized in the media or the courts as 
wrongfully convicted will necessarily obtain an acquittal. In the case of 
Romeo Phillion, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in a divided 2–1 decision, 
overturned his 1972 murder conviction. The Court of Appeal did not 
enter an acquittal because of its conclusion that a hypothetical jury at a 
new trial could reject his alibi evidence and still accept what he claims 
were his false confessions.31 The prosecutor’s subsequent decision to 
withdraw the murder charges, but not to offer any evidence so that 
Phillion could receive a not guilty verdict, was upheld as consistent with 
constitutional guarantees of fundamental fairness.32 At the same time, 
the media and innocence projects widely acknowledge Phillion as a 
wrongfully convicted and innocent person. The recognition of innocence 
and exoneration is a political, social, and scientific process that the 
criminal justice system does not fully support.33 
 
 26. HON FRED KAUFMAN, REPORT ON THE STEPHEN TRUSCOTT APPLICATION ¶ 164 (Sept. 2004). 
 27. R. v. Mullins-Johnson, 2007 ONCA 720 (Can.). 
 28. Id. 
 29. R. v. Hinse, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); Re Walsh, 2008 NBCA 33 (Can.). 
 30. Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575 (Can.); R. v. D.R.S. 2013 ABCA 18 (Can.). 
 31. Re Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202, ¶ 244 (Can.). 
 32. R. v. Phillion, 2010 ONSC 1604 (Can.). 
 33. Kent Roach, Exonerating the Wrongful Convicted: Do We Need Innocence Hearings, in 
HONOURING SOCIAL JUSTICE 55–84 (Beare ed., 2009). For arguments about differences between legal 
and media understandings, see SCHIFF & NOBLES, UNDERSTANDING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: LAW, 
MEDIA AND THE INEVITABILITY OF CRISIS (2000). For arguments that declarations of innocence should 
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Although factual innocence is not generally recognized in the 
Canadian criminal justice system, it is formally required for payment of 
compensation. Federal and provincial guidelines for compensation 
require factual innocence, even though criminal courts do not make such 
findings. Section 748(3) of the Criminal Code provides that when the 
Governor-in-Council grants a free pardon “that person shall be deemed 
thereafter never to have committed the offence in respect of which the 
pardon is granted.” This provision suggests that a free pardon may be a 
means to recognize innocence in Canada. In 1992, the Supreme Court 
indicated that a free pardon would be the appropriate remedy if David 
Milgaard satisfied the very high standard of establishing his innocence 
beyond a reasonable doubt.34 Milgaard did not satisfy this high standard 
at the 1992 reference. He was only exonerated and paid $10 million in 
compensation in 1997 after a DNA exclusion. The Milgaard case stands 
as a reminder of the difficulties of establishing innocence in the 
Canadian legal system, especially in cases where there is no DNA or 
other scientific evidence that is accepted as definitive.35 
Pardons are an awkward and arguably inappropriate device to 
recognize an accused’s innocence.36 One problem is the connotation of 
pardons with mercy. Another problem is that the federal Cabinet, and 
not the courts, grants pardons. A public inquiry in Canada recommended 
three women be given free pardons because they killed in legitimate 
self-defence. The Cabinet, however, refused to grant the free pardons 
because of concerns about public safety and the lack of compassionate 
grounds that were not related to the question of guilt or innocence.37 
Another measure of the number of wrongful convictions in Canada is 
the number of public inquiries, appointed by governments, into such 
 
be available in Canadian law, see Christopher Sherrin, Declarations of Innocence, 35 QUEENS L.J. 437 
(2010). 
 34. Reference re Milgaard, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 866 (Can.); see also, Re Therrien, 2001 SCC 35, ¶ 
121 (Can.) (recognizing the distinct nature of the free pardon). In the Milgaard reference, the Supreme 
Court recommended that Milgaard should receive a new trial. It also indicated that it would be open to 
the prosecutor not to proceed and to issue a prosecutorial stay and suggested that Milgaard should 
receive a conditional pardon if he was convicted at a new trial. The prosecutor did issue a stay while 
publicly maintaining his belief in Milgaard’s guilt until Milgaard’s 1997 DNA exoneration. 
 35. Before the Ontario Court of Appeal held it had no jurisdiction to make declarations of factual 
innocence, it decided that it could not declare Stephen Truscott to be innocent and speculated that it 
would be difficult to make any such declarations in the absence of DNA evidence. Re Truscott, 2007 
ONCA 575, ¶ 264 (Can.) (“The appellant has not demonstrated his factual innocence. To do so would 
be a most daunting task absent definitive forensic evidence such as DNA. Despite the appellant’s best 
efforts, that kind of evidence is not available.”). 
 36. They are used less frequently in Canadian wrongful conviction cases than American cases 
where 68 of 250 DNA exonerations obtained a pardon. BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT 230 (2011). 
 37. Gary Trotter, Justice, Politics, and the Royal Prerogative of Mercy: Examining the Self-
Defence Review, 26 QUEENS L.J. 353, 392 (2001). 
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matters. Since 1986, seven public inquiries have been appointed. These 
inquiries generally are headed by sitting or retired judges. They take a 
few years to examine and hold public hearings into wrongful 
convictions and to make recommendations for their prevention.38 Public 
inquiries are appointed at the discretion of the provincial governments 
and have only been appointed in a minority of all cases in which 
wrongful convictions have been recognized. The inquiries are generally 
only held when wrongful convictions have received sustained media 
attention, thus creating pressures on governments to respond by 
appointing an inquiry. 
Canada’s leading innocence project, the Association in Defence of the 
Wrongfully Convicted (AIDWYC), at present lists forty-three cases of 
wrongful convictions, starting with the 1959 conviction of Stephen 
Truscott. Eighteen of these cases are listed as exonerations.39 The 
eighteen exonerations recognized by AIDWYC are all homicide cases, 
except two that involved sexual assault and one that involved a break 
and enter. The profile of recognized wrongful convictions in Canada is 
closer to the profile of wrongful convictions in the United States40 than 
the United Kingdom.41 In other words, the vast majority of recognized 
wrongful convictions in Canada, like the United States, involve 
homicide or sexual assault. As such, the North American cases do not 
represent the wider range of cases that the CCRC has referred back to 
the court of appeal and the convictions that have been overturned in 
England and Wales.42 The fact that recognized wrongful convictions in 
Canada are generally limited to homicide or sexual assault cases 
suggests that many wrongful convictions may remain undetected in less 
 
 38. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE DONALD MARSHALL JR. PROSECUTION (1989); THE 
COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN (1998); THE INQUIRY REGARDING 
THOMAS SOPHONOW (2001); THE LAMER COMMISSION OF INQUIRY PERTAINING TO THE CASES OF 
RONALD DALTON, GREGORY PARSONS AND RANDY DRUKEN (2006); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF JAMES DRISKELL (2007); REPORT 
OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF DAVID MILGAARD (2008); REPORT OF THE 
INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY (2008). MARSHALL INQUIRY, supra note 6; MORIN 
INQUIRY, supra note 6; SOPHONOW INQUIRY, supra note 6; LAMER INQUIRY, supra note 6; DRISKELL 
INQUIRY, supra note 6; MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6. 
 39. Case Overview, ASSOC. IN DEF. OF THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED, http://www.aidwyc. 
org/AIDWYC_Cases.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2011) [hereinafter AIDWYC] (containing an 
international website lists 73 cases from Canada); see also Hans Sherrer, Wrongfully Convicted 
Database Index, FORE JUSTICE, http://forejustice.org/db/location/innocents_l.html (last visited Nov. 26, 
2011). 
 40. See, e.g., Samuel Gross et al, Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005); BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011). 
 41. LAURIE ELKS, RIGHTING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: TEN YEARS OF THE CRIMINAL CASES 
REVIEW COMMISSION (2008). 
 42. DNA exonerations may be slightly less important in Canadian than American profiles with 7 
of the 19 exonerations recognized by AIDWYC involving DNA. See AIDWYC, supra note 39.  
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serious cases. Cases other than murder and sexual assault have been 
overturned in England and Wales, suggesting that an independent 
review commission in Canada might help discover more wrongful 
convictions.43 
How many wrongful convictions in Canada are never detected? Even 
if the error rate resulting in wrongful convictions in Canada was 
exceedingly small,44 there may be large numbers of undiscovered 
wrongful convictions, given that about 90,000 criminal court cases 
result in a person being sentenced to custody in Canada each year. An 
error rate of only 0.5% would result in approximately 450 wrongful 
convictions a year. Two-thirds of cases in adult criminal court result in 
convictions on the basis of guilty pleas, but given the recent evidence of 
innocent people making both irrational and rational decisions to plead 
guilty,45 it cannot be assumed that all those in Canada who plead guilty 
actually are guilty. The prosecution terminates most of the remaining 
third of criminal cases. Only 3% of cases result in an acquittal,46 
suggesting that criminal trials only reject a very small percentage of all 
prosecutions. 
 
 43. At the same time, some of the cases where convictions were quashed after a CCRC referral 
may not be accepted by all as wrongful convictions and the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry 
Commission which has a mandate restricted to claims of proven factual innocence has referred 
comparatively fewer cases than the CCRC. See BIBI SANGHA, ET AL., FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS AND 
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 351–56 (2010); see also Kent Roach, The Role of Innocence Commissions: 
Errors Discovery, Systemic Reform or Both?, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 89 (2010). 
 44. See C.R. Huff, Wrongful Convictions and Public Policy, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2002) 
(applying a similar methodology to much larger numbers of felony convictions in the United States). 
 45. For an example of an irrational decision to plead guilty by a mentally disabled accused who 
provided a false confession see R. v. Marshall, 2005 QCCA 852 (Can.). For an example where the 
accused who had already served 8 months in pre-trial custody may have made a rational decision to 
plead guilty to break and enter and assault after being wrongfully identified in court and being offered a 
sentence of two years less a day see R. v. Hanemaayer, 2008 ONCA 580, ¶ 18 (Can.), where Rosenberg 
J.A., stated, “[T]he court cannot ignore the terrible dilemma facing the appellant. He has spent eight 
months in jail awaiting trial and was facing the prospect of a further six years in the penitentiary if [he] 
was convicted. . . . The justice system held out to the appellant a powerful inducement that by pleading 
guilty he would not receive a penitentiary sentence.” Note, in Canada those serving sentences of two 
years and more serve them in federal penitentiaries and those serving less than two years serve their 
sentences in provincial correctional institutions. See R. v. Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120, ¶ 34 (Can.) 
(recognizing the “powerful inducement” of a guilty plea in a child death case where the prosecutor 
withdrew a murder charge and a father who pled guilty to criminal negligence causing death received a 
90 day sentence and was able to maintain custody of his other children and avoid deportation); see 
generally Joan Brockman, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Pleading Guilty when Innocent, 56 CRIM. L.Q. 
116 (2010). 
 46. In total, the adult criminal courts dispose of almost 400,000 cases a year involving 1.1 
million charges. Jennifer Thomas, Adult Criminal Court Statistics 2008/2009, 30 JURISTAT. 4 (2010), 
available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11293-eng.pdf. More recent data 
has found just under 86,000 cases resulting in custody in Canada in a year but that the median custodial 
sentence was 30 days. Mia Dauvergne Adult Criminal Court Statistics 2010/2011, 28 (2012), available 
at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/11646-eng.pdf. Most people serving a 
sentence of a few months or less would not have the incentive to contest a wrongful conviction. 
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In summary, there is an increasing recognition of the reality of 
wrongful convictions in Canada, with many cases being recognized as 
wrongful convictions. A number of recent wrongful convictions, 
stemming from guilty pleas, suggest that the incidence of wrongful 
convictions among the majority of accused who pled guilty may be 
higher than previously appreciated. The Canadian criminal justice 
system only acquits about 3% of cases that are prosecuted, again 
suggesting that the criminal trial only infrequently protects the innocent. 
It is simply impossible to determine how many wrongful convictions 
occur but remain undetected. Most discovered wrongful conviction 
cases in Canada, as in the United States, are homicide or sexual assault 
cases and generally require much time and pro-bono assistance to 
reveal. This again suggests that there may be many undiscovered 
wrongful convictions in Canada.  
III. TWO CASE STUDIES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
The following case studies examine one of the oldest recognized 
wrongful conviction in Canada—the 1971 conviction of a seventeen 
year old Aboriginal man Donald Marshall Jr. for a murder that he did 
not commit, and one of the most recently recognized wrongful 
convictions—the 1995 murder conviction of a twenty-one year old 
woman, Tammy Marquardt, for the killing of her son. Marshall served 
eleven years in jail and Marquardt served thirteen years in jail. 
A. The Wrongful Conviction of Donald Marshall Jr. 
Donald Marshall Jr. was convicted in 1971 of the murder of Sandy 
Seale in the Nova Scotia community of Sydney. The seventeen year-old 
Aboriginal man was known to the local police and the lead investigator 
badgered three teenaged witnesses until they eventually testified at 
Marshall’s preliminary inquiry that they saw Marshall stab Seale in a 
park. In reality, Roy Ebsary had stabbed both Marshall and Seale. None 
of the witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements that they had not seen 
Marshall stab Seale were disclosed to the accused. At the time, there 
was no right to disclosure and disclosure was voluntary. The prosecutor 
in the case often provided disclosure, but Marshall’s lawyers did not 
even ask for disclosure. Two of the witnesses attempted to recant their 
false testimony at trial, but the judge disallowed full cross-examination 
about why one witness had recanted out of court. The judge seemed to 
assume that the recantation may have been related to threats from 
Marshall, even though Marshall had been denied bail and was 
imprisoned. Another witness at first declined to testify at trial that 
12
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Marshall had stabbed Seale, but eventually did so after his prior 
testimony to that effect at a preliminary inquiry was read to him as a 
prior inconsistent statement. 
Marshall testified at his trial before an all-white, all-male jury that a 
man who fit Ebsary’s description had made racist remarks about both 
Marshall and Seale, who was African-Canadian, and stabbed them both. 
Marshall was not allowed to ask prospective jurors questions about 
racial bias, as he would be now,47 and one of the jurors explained the 
verdict later to a reporter through racist assumptions.48 The commission 
of inquiry that subsequently examined Marshall’s wrongful conviction 
did not examine the jury’s verdict, despite the fact that the conviction 
depended on them finding the testimony of witnesses, who reluctantly 
lied and said they saw Marshall stab Seale, more credible than 
Marshall’s testimony that he did not stab Seale, and the possibility that 
the jury might have been influenced by irrelevant evidence such as 
Marshall’s “I hate cops” tattoo and the testimony of Seale’s grieving 
parents. 
Marshall’s own lawyers, though well paid by Marshall’s Indian band, 
conducted no independent investigation and may have believed that 
Marshall was guilty, in part because Marshall was Aboriginal.49 
Marshall was also not well represented at his first appeal, with his 
lawyers not raising legal errors, such as the prevention of a full cross-
examination of a recanting witness, errors that the inquiry subsequently 
found would have prevented his wrongful conviction. Marshall’s 
lawyers also unsuccessfully argued to the court of appeal that the lesser 
offence of manslaughter should have been left to the jury,50 something 
that was inconsistent with Marshall’s constant claims of innocence. A 
three-judge panel of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal unanimously 
dismissed Marshall’s appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada 
subsequently refused to grant leave to appeal. 
Ten days after Marshall’s conviction, James McNeil told the police 
that his companion Ebsary, and not Marshall, had killed Seale. 
Unfortunately, this new evidence known to both police and prosecutors 
was not disclosed to the accused at the time. It was, however, eventually 
used as new evidence to reverse Marshall’s conviction. Because his 
appeals had been exhausted, Marshall had to petition the federal 
Minister of Justice for the mercy of the Crown. He obtained an order for 
a new appeal in 1982, but only after the Chief Justice of Nova Scotia 
 
 47. R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (Can.). 
 48. Kent Roach, Inquiries and Processes of Accountability, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 268, 268–93 (Stenning ed., 1995). 
 49. MARSHALL INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 77. 
 50. R. v. Marshall, (1972) 8 C.C.C. (2d) 329 (Can.). 
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had expressed reservation about hearing the case as a simple reference, 
which would have meant that Marshall would not bear the burden of 
proof or face the possibility of a new trial.51 Marshall was granted bail 
pending this new appeal.  
In 1983, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal quashed Marshall’s murder 
conviction after considering new evidence, including McNeil’s 
testimony that he was with Ebsary when Ebsary stabbed Seale. The 
prosecutor in the case agreed that an acquittal should be entered, though 
he was pressured by his superiors not to do so. At the same time, the 
court of appeal blamed Marshall for his wrongful conviction. The court 
of appeal stated that Marshall had perjured himself by not admitting that 
he and Seale had intended to rob Ebsary and concluded that “any 
miscarriage of justice is, however, more apparent than real.”52 Although 
legal errors played a role, Marshall’s wrongful conviction was factually 
based. Both the jury that convicted him and the Court of Appeal that 
eventually overturned his conviction simply refused to believe that 
Marshall was telling the truth, despite the existence of other evidence 
that supported the truth of his statements. 
The inquiry subsequently criticized the court of appeal for defending 
the justice system at Marshall’s expense and for allowing a person who 
had been attorney general and ultimately responsible for Marshall’s 
prosecution to sit as a judge on the appeal. The inquiry, however, lost a 
court battle to have the judges on the reference explain themselves on 
the grounds that such questioning would interfere with judicial 
independence.53 The five court of appeal judges who sat on the reference 
were subsequently found by the Canadian Judicial Council, composed of 
judges, to have engaged in misconduct, but not misconduct that 
warranted their removal from the bench.54 Marshall attempted to sue the 
police, but his case was dismissed when he could not post security for 
costs. He subsequently received $225,000 plus interest in compensation. 
A 1989 inquiry into Marshall’s wrongful conviction contributed to his 
official exoneration, with a report that included a refutation of the court 
of appeal’s conclusion that Marshall had been engaged in robbery. The 
inquiry recommended that the Criminal Code be amended to require the 
prosecution to disclose useful information to the accused. Parliament did 
not act, but the Supreme Court cited the Marshall case and the inquiry’s 
 
 51. MARSHALL INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 115. Governments in Canada can refer questions to 
courts in part because of the absence of a case and controversy requirement in the Canadian constitution. 
 52. R. v. Marshall, (1983) 57 N.S.R. (2d) 286 (Can.).  
 53. Mackeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796 (Can.). 
 54. C.J. MCEACHERN, ET AL., REPORT TO THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COMMITTEE (1990), 
available at http://cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/conduct_inq_HartJonesMacdonald_ReportIC_199008_ 
en.pdf. For articles, many that are critical of this decision, see The Symposium, 40 U. NEW BRUNSWICK 
L.J. 262 ff. (1991). 
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report in a 1991 case that created a broad constitutional right for the 
accused to receive disclosure of all relevant and non-privileged 
information in the prosecution’s possession.55 The inquiry also 
recommended that an appointed Director of Public Prosecution 
supervise all prosecutions and that the law school in Nova Scotia 
promote the training of both Aboriginal and African-Canadian 
minorities, both reforms that were subsequently implemented. The 
inquiry also recommended that an independent review mechanism be 
available to re-investigate alleged cases of wrongful convictions, but this 
recommendation has not been implemented. 
B. The Wrongful Conviction of Tammy Marquardt 
Tammy Marquardt, a twenty-one year-old woman and single mother, 
was convicted of murder in 1995 for killing her two and one-half year 
old son. Her son had a history of epileptic seizures and had, at 
Marquardt’s request, temporarily been placed in the custody of child 
welfare officials. Marquardt consistently denied killing her son. 
Marquardt’s lawyer attempted to question prospective jurors about 
whether they might be prejudiced by the allegations of child killing, but 
the trial judge did not allow such questions to be put to prospective 
jurors, concluding that he was “not persuaded that there is a reasonable 
potential for the existence of partiality in the minds of the proposed 
jurors based upon all of the material before the court including the very 
nature of the charge itself.”56 Potential jurors are not as readily 
questioned in Canada as in the United States about whether they may be 
biased against the accused. 
The main evidence at trial against Marquardt came from the 
testimony of Dr. Charles Smith, a pathologist who testified that the 
cause of her son’s death was asphyxia and cited petechial haemorrhages 
and brain swelling as evidence in support of his opinion.57 The defence 
called no medical evidence to challenge this testimony, but argued that 
the child’s death might have been caused by an epileptic seizure.  
Forensic pathologists subsequently found flaws in Dr. Smith’s work 
in this, and other child death cases. They found his work flawed in 
twenty of forty child death cases that they reviewed, and a subsequent 
 
 55. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. 
 56. R. v. Marquardt (1995), 44 C.R. (4th). 4th 353, ¶ 910 (Ont.Ct. (Gen.Div.)). 
 57. Dr. Smith testified “his findings were “consistent with” suffocation with a soft object, a 
pillow, a plastic bag or if someone held his nose and mouth closed and he was suffocated that way. He 
discounted seizure as a cause of death as he had no evidence “of that at all.” In particular, he testified 
that “you don’t have evidence of asphyxia” from sudden and unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP). 
However, he allowed that he was not an expert on this condition and the opinion of a pediatric 
neurologist would be better than his opinion on that issue. R. v. Marquardt, 2011 ONCA 281, ¶ 9 (Can.). 
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inquiry found that Smith’s work was not adequately supervised, and 
frequently not subject to adequate adversarial challenge in court. In 
Marquardt’s case, the reviewing forensic pathologists found that 
asphyxia was not supported in the evidence as the cause of death, which 
in their view was unascertained, with a fatal epileptic seizure not being 
excluded. The inquiry also found that Dr. Smith saw his role as 
supporting the prosecution, as opposed to providing impartial expert 
evidence. Dr. Smith also made inappropriate references to his personal 
experience and irrelevant, but prejudicial, factors about the families of 
deceased children and used inappropriate language when he testified.58 
Marquardt appealed her conviction to the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
but the appeal was dismissed in 1998. The appeal did not challenge Dr. 
Smith’s evidence but rather suggested that the trial judge erred by not 
relating the evidence to a possible manslaughter verdict. This ground of 
appeal implicitly suggested that Marquardt might be guilty, but should 
have been convicted of a lesser form of homicide. This feature of both 
the Marquardt and Marshall cases suggests that defence lawyers may not 
have been as attentive to their client’s claims of innocence as they 
should. As in the Marshall case, the manslaughter argument raised by 
Marquardt’s lawyer on appeal was not successful, with the court of 
appeal correctly stressing that the only defence raised at trial was that 
her son died through natural causes or accident.59  
In a number of other cases involving Dr. Smith, parents accepted plea 
bargains to lesser forms of homicides to avoid the mandatory sentence 
of life imprisonment that follows a murder conviction in Canada.60 Both 
with respect to guilty pleas and appeals, the Canadian criminal justice 
system does not provide sufficient protections for accused to persist in 
 
 58. GOUDGE INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 162, 183, 188. 
 59. The Court of Appeal concluded that the manslaughter “verdict was tenuous . . . . The only 
defence advanced at trial was accident. The trial judge properly directed the jury that if they had a 
reasonable doubt that the death was accidental, the appellant was entitled to an acquittal. The appellant, 
in her extensive and detailed testimony, gave no evidence capable of supporting a manslaughter verdict 
either on the basis of a loss of control or excessive use of force to quiet the child. The appellant denied 
being angry, denied being under any special stress due to her relationship with her husband, denied any 
need to discipline the child, denied having had a black-out, in short denied being in any kind of mental 
state that would support a lack of intent. There was no other physical or circumstantial evidence to 
suggest that the appellant lacked the requisite intent at the time of the death. On the other hand, the 
medical and other evidence strongly suggested at least an intent to cause bodily harm that the appellant 
knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether death ensued or not. It was sufficient that the 
intent and the act of suffocation coincided at some point.” R. v. Marquardt, (1998) 124 C.C.C. 3d 375, ¶ 
6–7 (Can.). 
 60. For examples of guilty pleas being subsequently overturned in cases involving Dr. Smith see 
R. v. Sheratt Robinson, 2009 ONCA 886 (Can.); R. v. C.F., 2010 ONCA 691 (Can.); R. v. C.M., 2010 
ONCA 690 (Can.); R. v. Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120 (Can.); R. v. Brant, 2011 ONCA 362 (Can.) (parents 
pled guilty to reduced homicide in the child’s death in the face of forensic pathology evidence later 
shown to be unreliable). 
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claims of innocence. Both Marshall and Marquardt would have spent 
less time in jail if they had pled guilty to manslaughter, even though 
both were innocent. In some respects, the Canadian criminal justice 
system penalizes accused for persisting in claims of innocence. 
Marquardt never appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada because 
she had been denied legal aid funding. In 2009, after the revelations and 
inquiry into Dr. Smith, she appealed to the Supreme Court with notice of 
fresh evidence relating to the unreliability of Dr. Smith’s testimony at 
trial. In a short summary judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada 
granted the leave to appeal out of time and remanded the case to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal to consider the fresh evidence. The prosecution 
did not oppose this motion.61 
A judge of the court of appeal granted Marquardt bail, pending the 
hearing of appeal, thus releasing her from thirteen years of 
imprisonment.62 In 2011, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the 
fresh medical evidence and found that it “shows that Dr. Smith made 
several significant errors that could have misled the jury and led to a 
miscarriage of justice.”63 The errors included finding asphyxia on the 
basis of non-specific petechial haemorrhages and stating that the 
autopsy excluded epilepsy as a cause of death. The court of appeal held 
that in light of the new evidence, the conviction was a miscarriage of 
justice. It did not acquit Marquardt, but instead ordered a new trial, in 
part because it did not accept expert testimony that epilepsy was the 
cause of death, as it was outside the scope of expertise of two pediatric 
neurologists who gave portions of the fresh evidence.64 The Crown 
subsequently withdrew the murder charge with the trial judge expressing 
regret for what had happened.65 The government has offered $250,000 
in compensation,66 but Marquardt is understandably seeking more, given 
both her thirteen years in prison and her loss of contact with two other 
sons who the state subsequently put up for adoption after she was 
wrongfully convicted. 
 
 61. Tammy Marie Marquardt v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2009 Can LII 21729 (SCC), available 
at http://canlii.ca/t/23dkg. 
 62. She was granted parole at one time, but it was subsequently revoked. 
 63. Marquardt, 2011 ONCA 281, ¶ 16. 
 64. Id. ¶ 21. 
 65. Tracey Tyler, Murder Charges Withdrawn Against Mother Wrongfully Convicted of Killing 
Son, 2, TORONTO STAR, June 7, 2011, available at http://www.thestar.com/news/crime/2011/06/07/ 
murder_charges_withdrawn_against_mother_wrongfully_convicted_of_killing_son_2.html. 
 66. Kevin Connor, Wrongfully Accused Mom to Get $250,000, OTTAWA SUN, Aug. 11, 2010, 
available at http://www.ottawasun.com/news/Canada/2010/08/10/14982991.html. 
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IV. THE LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR OVERTURNING OLD CONVICTIONS  
ON THE BASIS OF NEW EVIDENCE 
The above case studies represent the two major methods for 
overturning wrongful convictions in Canada. In Marshall’s case, a new 
appeal was ordered as a result of a petition to the federal Minister of 
Justice and Marshall was granted bail pending that appeal. In 
Marquardt’s case, the Supreme Court granted an appeal out of time and  
remanded the case back to the Ontario Court of Appeal to hear fresh 
evidence. Marquardt was granted bail pending this appeal which 
considered the fresh evidence and overturned a conviction. The Court of 
Appeal ordered a new trial but the prosecutor withdrew the charge.  
Canadian courts are relatively generous in allowing both appeals out 
of time and new evidence to be admitted, especially in cases where the 
prosecutor consents to such procedures. This procedure has been used 
with the prosecutor’s consent to reverse convictions, often from guilty 
pleas, in a series of child death cases where new evidence demonstrated 
that the conviction based on the evidence of pathologist Charles Smith 
was flawed. Although due diligence is a formal prerequisite for the 
admission of new evidence, Canadian courts have consistently held that 
this requirement should not stand in the way of a correction of a 
miscarriage of justice.  
Another important mechanism for recognizing wrongful convictions 
in Canada is the ability of courts to grant bail to a person pending a new 
appeal or even pending a petition to the Minister of Justice to order a 
new trial or a new appeal.67 For many of the wrongly convicted in 
Canada, such bail decisions are their first breath of freedom and their 
first official recognition that they have been wrongfully convicted. 
A. Appeals  
Canada has a unitary criminal court system, but one that has fairly 
wide appeal rights that can assist in the overturning of wrongful 
convictions. The accused has a right to appeal to the provincial court of 
appeal on any ground that raises a question of law alone. The accused 
can also appeal questions of mixed law and fact and other matters with 
the leave of the court of appeal, which generally hears appeals in panels 
 
 67. Bail pending appeal is governed by s.679 of the Criminal Code and can be ordered in cases 
where the ground of appeal is not frivolous and detention is not necessary in the public interest. For an 
example of the use of this power in a miscarriage of justice case see R. v. Parsons, (1997) 124 
C.C.C.(3d), 92 (Can. Nfld. C.A.). For examples of bail being granted pending the Minister of Justice’s 
decision whether to re-open a case and order a new trial or a new appeal see R. v. Phillion, [2003] O.J. 
No. 3422 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of Just.); R. v. Driskell, 2004 MBQB 3 (Can.); R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB 
238 (Can.); Ostrowski v. The Queen et al., 2009 MBQB 327 (Can.). 
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of three judges.68 The appeal court can assign publicly funded counsel to 
assist in the appeal when it is desirable in the interests of justice.69 The 
accused has a right to an additional appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada on any question of law on which an appeal court judge 
dissents.70 The Supreme Court can also hear appeals on matters of 
national importance, but denies the vast majority of such applications 
without written reasons. Various rules of courts provide time limits for 
the accused to give notice of appeal, but appeal courts have a statutory 
right to extend time71 and have done so after decades of delay in cases 
where the accused presents fresh evidence as a reason for a delayed 
appeal. In cases involving possible wrongful convictions, appeal courts 
have also granted their discretion to hear moot appeals involving dead 
accused.72 Canada does not have a tradition found in the United States of 
statutes of limitations barring appeals or the admission of fresh 
evidence. 
The court of appeal can allow an appeal from the conviction on the 
basis of 1) legal error that is not harmless73 or 2) the conviction is 
unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence or 3) any ground 
that there was a miscarriage of justice.74 The Ontario Court of Appeal 
has characterized the accused’s appeal rights, combined with the power 
to admit fresh evidence and hear evidence from witnesses under s.683 of 
the Criminal Code “in the interests of justice,” as “broad rights of 
appeal.” It has stated that “the broad rights of appeal, the power to 
receive fresh evidence, and the court’s wide remedial powers are all 
designed to maximize protection against wrongful convictions.”75 This 
statement was made in the course of a ruling in which the accused 
sought disclosure of material related to Dr. Smith, a pathologist whose 
faulty work led to the appointment of the Goudge Inquiry and the 
recognition of a number of wrongful convictions. The Supreme Court 
 
 68. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46 s.675. 
 69. Id. s.684. Neither this section nor the Charter provides an automatic right to have assistance 
of state funded counsel. R. v. Robinson, (1989), 51 C.C.C.3d 452 (Alta.C.A.); R. v. Baig (1990), 58 
C.C.C.3d 156 (B.C.C.A.), leave refused 60 C.C.C.3d vi (S.C.C.). 
 70. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, s.691. 
 71. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, s.678. 
 72. R. v. Smith, 2004 SCC 14, ¶47 (Can.) (discussing R. v. Jette, (1999) 141 C.C.C.3d 52 (Can. 
Que. C.A.) in which an appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings entered in a case where fresh 
evidence was admitted suggesting that the accused’s statements had been extracted involuntarily and 
that perjured testimony about the accused making an incriminating statement to an informant had been 
introduced at trial). 
 73. In what is commonly called “the proviso,” the Court of Appeal can dismiss an appeal under 
s.686(1)(b)(iii) in cases where, even though the trial judge made an error of law, the Court of Appeal “is 
of the opinion that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred.” 
 74. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, s.686(1)(b)(iii). 
 75. R. v. Trotta (2004), 23 C.R. (6th) 261, ¶ 24 (Ont. C.A.). 
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eventually ordered a new trial in the Trotta case, despite the Crown’s 
argument that a conviction could be sustained without Dr. Smith’s 
testimony given the pattern of child abuse. The Supreme Court held that 
it was: 
[N]either safe nor sound to conclude that the verdicts on any of the 
charges would necessarily have been the same but for Dr. Smith’s 
successfully impugned evidence. To attempt at this stage to insulate the 
effect of Dr. Smith’s evidence on one count from its possible effect on 
the others would amount to an unwarranted exercise in appellate 
speculation.76 
The Court ordered a new trial, but one of the accused was convicted of 
manslaughter at the retrial. The Supreme Court’s concern about the 
safety of the first guilty verdict may respond to criticisms that, unlike in 
Britain or Australia, the Canadian Criminal Code does not specifically 
authorize appeals due to concerns about the safety of verdicts. 
Justice Kaufman, in his commission of inquiry report on the Guy Paul 
Morin case, recommended that consideration should be given to 
changing the powers of the court of appeal so that they could “set aside 
a conviction where [there exists] a ‘lurking doubt’ as to[] guilt . . . .”77 
He found that appellate courts implicitly, and in a few cases explicitly, 
considered the safety of verdicts when determining whether a conviction 
was reasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. He stressed the 
following: 
[A]n appellate court can overestimate the importance of seeing or hearing 
the witnesses. A substantial part of credibility is the internal consistency 
of a witnesses’ testimony (however well or badly that witness presents) 
and its consistency with other known facts. If the record produces a 
lurking doubt or a sense of disquiet about the verdict of guilt, should an 
appellate court not be empowered to act upon that sense after fully 
articulating those aspects of the record that have produced that doubt? No 
doubt, many appellate judges who sense a potential injustice do this—
sometimes indirectly—through their determination of whether there was a 
legal error at trial. With respect, a disquieting conviction may compel an 
appeal to be allowed on the most esoteric misdirection relating to a point 
of law that only legal scholars might appreciate. It is well arguable that a 
slightly broadened scope for appellate intervention permits the Court to 
do directly what some judges now do indirectly. It recognizes the most 
important, though not exclusive, function of a criminal appellate court: to 
 
 76. R. v. Trotta, 2007 SCC 49, ¶ 14(Can.). This decision reversed an earlier one of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal that had upheld the conviction on the basis that “there was cogent, if not overwhelming, 
evidence that Paolo was a battered child and that Marco was his abuser.” R. v. Trotta, (2004), 190. 
C.C.C. (3d) 199, ¶ 31 (Can.) and on the basis that the Crown had provided overwhelming evidence that 
the child was abused during his eight month life and that “there will never be a perfect trial.” Id. at ¶ 98. 
 77. MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 1176. 
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ensure that no person is convicted of a crime that he or she did not 
commit.78 
Despite this recommendation, s.686 of the Criminal Code has not been 
amended to allow convictions to be reversed on the basis of a lurking 
doubt or even the British ground of safety, though courts of appeal 
continue, as in the Trotta case, to make reference to the safety of 
convictions. 
In R. v. Biniaris,79 the Supreme Court was asked to adopt the lurking 
doubt standard. In that case, the Court upheld a murder conviction, even 
though the Crown pathologist changed her testimony after having 
consulted with the defence pathologists to the effect that the accused’s 
actions in stomping on the deceased did not cause the victim’s death. 
Justice Arbour for the Court rejected the lurking doubt standard, stating: 
It is insufficient for the court of appeal to refer to a vague unease, or a 
lingering or lurking doubt based on its own review of the evidence. This 
“lurking doubt” may be a powerful trigger for thorough appellate scrutiny 
of the evidence, but it is not, without further articulation of the basis for 
such doubt, a proper basis upon which to interfere with the findings of a 
jury. In other words, if, after reviewing the evidence at the end of an 
error-free trial which led to a conviction, the appeal court judge is left 
with a lurking doubt or feeling of unease, that doubt, which is not in itself 
sufficient to justify interfering with the conviction, may be a useful signal 
that the verdict was indeed reached in a non-judicial manner. In that case, 
the court of appeal must proceed further with its analysis.80 
The Court did, however, state that appellate courts should examine 
convictions “through the lens of judicial experience which serves as an 
additional protection against an unwarranted conviction.”81 The Court 
also indicated that an appellate court could overturn a conviction as 
unreasonable on the basis of a mix of objective and subjective factors.  
Appellate courts are more likely to find convictions unreasonable in 
the majority of Canadian cases where a judge alone tries the accused and 
the appeal court can review the trial judge’s reasons for convicting,82 as 
 
 78. Id. at 1187–88. 
 79. 2000 SCC 15. 
 80. Id. at ¶ 38. 
 81. Id. at ¶ 40. 
 82. Compare, R. v. Burke, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 474 (Can.) (reversing a historical indecent assault 
conviction on the basis of the judge’s reasoning), with R. v. Francois, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 827 (Can.) 
(upholding a historical rape conviction rendered by a jury). The Supreme Court has recently affirmed 
that judge’s verdicts will be subject to more searching reasonableness review because “judges, unlike 
juries, give reasons for their findings which the appellate court may review and consider as part of its 
reasonableness analysis. However, this expanded reasonableness review entered by trial judges do not 
apply to reasonableness review of a jury verdict.” R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 23, ¶ 26. The differences of 
appellate review of judges alone and jury convictions was narrowed in R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5 
(Can.) where the majority of the Court upheld a judge alone conviction stressing that the issue was 
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opposed to the minority of cases in Canada which are tried before a 
judge and jury.83 The Supreme Court has confirmed its deference to jury 
verdicts when it recently held that an appellate court had erred in 
reversing a jury’s conviction in a historical sexual assault because of the 
judges’ concerns about inconsistencies in the complainant’s account of 
the case. The Court specifically warned that the reviewing court must 
not “act as a ‘13th juror’ or simply give effect to vague unease or lurking 
doubt based on its own review of the written record or find that a verdict 
is unreasonable simply because the reviewing court had a reasonable 
doubt based on its review of the record.”84 The Court recognized that 
“appellate review for unreasonableness of guilty verdict is a powerful 
safeguard against wrongful convictions” but nevertheless insisted that it 
“must be exercised with great deference to the fact-finding role of the 
jury. Trial by jury must not become trial by appellate court on the 
written record.”85  
Another ground for allowing appeals from convictions is “on any 
ground that there was a miscarriage of justice.” “In every case, if the 
reviewing court concludes that the error, whether procedural or 
substantive, led to a denial of a fair trial, the court may properly 
characterize the matter as one where there was a miscarriage of 
justice.”86 In such cases a new trial is the minimal remedy that the 
appellate court must order. There may also be a miscarriage of justice 
where the trial judge misapprehended evidence on matters of substance 
rather than detail, but only if such matters are material to the verdicts 
and the error plays “an essential part not just in the narrative of the 
judgment but ‘in the reasoning process resulting in a conviction.’”87  
The miscarriage of justice ground for allowing an appeal is of 
particular importance in cases where new evidence is admitted on 
appeal. In its Truscott Reference,88 the Ontario Court of Appeal 
commented that on appeals that consider fresh evidence:  
[S]ection 686(1)(a)(iii) is the only provision that is potentially relevant. It 
allows an appellate court to grant an appeal ‘on any ground there was a 
 
whether the conviction was reasonable, not the trial judge’s reasons. This case is a step backward in 
overturning wrongful convictions because as the minority emphasized it is dangerous to uphold a 
conviction based on bad or illogical reasoning.  
 83. Accused in Canada only have a constitutional right under s.11(f) of the Charter to be tried 
before a jury if they face five years imprisonment or more and even in such circumstances most accused 
elect under the Criminal Code to be tried by judge alone. See M.L. Friedland & Kent Roach, Borderline 
Justice: Choosing Juries in the Two Niagaras, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 120 (1997). 
 84. R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 22 at para 27. (Can.). 
 85. Id. at ¶ 32. 
 86. R. v. Khan, 2001 SCC 86, ¶ 27 (Can.). 
 87. R. v. Loher, 2004 SCC 80, ¶ 2 (Can.). 
 88. 2007 ONCA 575 (Can.). 
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miscarriage of justice’. This power can reach virtually any kind of error 
that renders the trial unfair in a procedural or substantive way. The 
section has been applied on appeals where there was no unfairness at 
trial, but evidence was admitted on appeal that placed the reliability of 
the conviction in serious doubt. In these cases, the miscarriage of justice 
lies not in the conduct of the trial or even the conviction as entered at 
trial, but rather in maintaining the conviction in the face of new evidence 
that renders the conviction factually unreliable.89 
Appeals on grounds of miscarriages of justice in Canada thus allow 
convictions to be quashed both on the basis that the trial was not fair and 
on the basis that new evidence places the reliability of the conviction in 
serious doubt. This decision demonstrates the flexibility of the legal 
term miscarriage of justice and its ability to include, but not be limited 
to, cases of factual innocence. 
The most common grounds of appeal are not, however, that the 
verdict is unreasonable or constitutes a miscarriage of justice, but rather 
that trial judges erred in law in either their reasons or instructions to 
juries. Even if an appeal court finds an error of law, it can sustain a 
conviction if it concludes “no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice 
has occurred.”90 In other words, the trial judge’s errors of law can be 
held to be harmless to the guilty verdict. The proviso at least requires the 
appellate court to address its mind to the question of whether there has 
been a miscarriage of justice. The proviso or harmless error rule can be 
applied to even major errors of law, but “only if it is clear that the 
evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused is so overwhelming that 
any other verdict but a conviction would be impossible.”91 A new trial 
should be ordered after a finding of an error of law unless there is no 
reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different.92 In 
cases where the error of law was the exclusion of exculpatory evidence, 
any reasonable effect that the evidence could have had on the jury 
should be considered.93 In cases where the error of law was the inclusion 
of inadmissible evidence, the appeal should be allowed and a new trial 
ordered if there is any possibility that a trial judge would have had a 
reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilt on the basis of the admissible 
evidence.94  
In a recent case, the Supreme Court split 5-4 and held that the trial 
judge’s admission of prejudicial investigative hearsay without a limiting 
 
 89. Id. at ¶ 110. 
 90. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.686(1)(b)(iii). 
 91. Khan, 2001 SCC 86, ¶ 31. 
 92. R. v. Bevan, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599 (Can.). 
 93. R. v. Wildman, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 311 (Can.). 
 94. R. v. S (P.L.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 909 (Can.). 
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instruction to the jury was a harmless error in a case where the accused 
alleged that the police had inadequately investigated an alternative 
hypothesis that loan sharks had attempted to murder the victim. The 
majority held that the admission of the investigating officer’s opinion 
that the accused was guilty did not result in a substantial wrong or 
miscarriage of justice. In contrast, the dissenting judges concluded that 
the Crown had not discharged its onus that there was no reasonable 
possibility that the legal error did not make a difference to the outcome 
of the case.95 Unfortunately, the Court did not advert to American 
studies finding that appeal courts had found legal errors to be harmless 
in 38% of cases of DNA exonerees.96 There is a danger that appeals are 
not as effective as they should be in detecting wrongful convictions. 
The prosecutor in Canada can appeal an acquittal, but only on the 
basis that the acquittal was based on an error of law.97 In at least one 
case, a prosecutor’s successful appeal from an acquittal resulted in a 
wrongful conviction. In that case, the Crown successfully appealed Guy 
Paul Morin’s original acquittal of murder on the basis that the trial judge 
had erred in law by inviting the jury to apply the reasonable doubt 
standard to each piece of evidence.98 The Commission of Inquiry into 
Morin’s wrongful conviction recommended that the Criminal Code be 
amended to require the Crown to demonstrate that the verdict likely 
would have been different had the trial judge not made the error of 
law.99 The Supreme Court has subsequently held that an error of law 
must be reasonably thought to have a material bearing on the acquittal. 
That said, the prosecutor does not have to establish that the verdict 
would necessarily have been different to receive an order for a new trial 
after a successful prosecutorial appeal from an acquittal.100 The 
relatively broad appeal rights enjoyed by accused in Canada are 
balanced by the ability of the prosecutors to appeal acquittals. 
B. Fresh Evidence on Appeal 
Section 683 of the Criminal Code provides courts of appeal with 
broad powers to consider fresh evidence. The court of appeal can also 
order production of things and provide for the examination and cross-
 
 95. R. v. Van, 2009 SCC 22 (Can.). 
 96. BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 201 (2011) (involving 62 of 165 cases 
with written decisions); See also Brandon Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 108 
(2008) (an earlier study finding 32% of exonerees). 
 97. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.676. 
 98. R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345 (Can.). 
 99. MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 1188. 
 100. R. v. Graveline, 2006 SCC 16 (Can.). 
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examination of witnesses before the court of appeal or other body. The 
test for the admission of fresh evidence is that the evidence must: 
(1) bear on a decisive or potentially decisive issue;  
(2) the evidence must be credible;  
(3) the evidence, if believed, could affect the result; and  
(4) the evidence should generally not have been obtainable at trial by due 
diligence.101 
Courts have consistently held that the due diligence requirement 
should not be applied as strictly in criminal as in civil cases. The 
Supreme Court made clear that the due diligence requirement was not 
essential and must yield where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise 
result.102 In a recent case, the Supreme Court allowed the accused to 
admit as fresh evidence a forensic dentist’s opinion that an injury to an 
accused convicted of sexual assault was not a bite mark, even though the 
accused conceded that the new evidence could have been obtained by 
due diligence at trial. The Court stressed that “it would be unsafe to 
uphold the convictions” given the closeness of the case and the fact that 
a police officer was allowed at trial to provide his opinion that the injury 
was the result of a bite mark.103 
The court of appeal can also appoint a special commissioner to 
inquire and report back on matters, including scientific matters that 
cannot “conveniently be inquired into before the court of appeal.”104 
This provision is an interesting inquisitorial aspect of the appellate 
process in Canada that has been used in at least one wrongful conviction 
case.105 The addition of inquisitorial aspects to the adversary system 
could in some cases help prevent or remedy wrongful convictions by 
demonstrating an official commitment that the state should take efforts 
to discover the truth.106 
C. DNA 
DNA has played a decisive role in revealing many wrongful 
convictions in Canada, particularly those involving hair analysis and 
sexual assault or murder. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court 
of Canada, in holding that it would be unconstitutional to extradite a 
person without assurances that the death penalty would not be applied, 
 
 101. Manhas v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 591 (Can.). 
 102. G.D.B, 2000 SCC 22, ¶ 37. 
 103. R. v. J.A.A, [2011] 1 S.C.R 628, ¶14(Can.). 
 104. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.683(1)(e). 
 105. R. v. Nepoose, [1992] 125 A.R. 28, 29 (Can.).  
 106. Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Themes, 35 N.C. INT’L L. 
& COM. REG. 387, 430–32 (2010). 
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has rightly stressed that DNA will not be available in many potential 
wrongful conviction cases.107 DNA evidence can reveal flaws in the 
criminal justice system that result in wrongful convictions, but it is not a 
panacea for the problems of wrongful convictions. 
The Criminal Code allows judges to grant warrants to obtain DNA 
samples and to collect DNA samples from an expanding list of 
convicted offenders.108 There are provisions that limit the use of such 
DNA samples to the investigation of designated offences and that 
provide for destruction of the DNA sample after an acquittal or 
dismissal of charges.109 The focus of this legislation and the DNA data 
bank containing over 200,000 convicted offender profiles and over 
65,000 crime scene profiles110 is on crime control though it may also 
preserve DNA evidence that will be critical in revealing wrongful 
convictions. 
There are no specific provisions in the DNA legislation, as there are 
in the American Innocence Protection Act,111 that provide for a person 
who has been convicted to have access to DNA samples. At the same 
time, an appeal court under s.683(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code 
could order the production of DNA material as evidence relating to 
proceedings, and trial judges would likely have similar powers. In many 
cases, prosecutors consent to the testing of evidence that may contain 
DNA. Disputes and delays do occur and they can delay the discovery of 
wrongful convictions.  
The Morin Inquiry recommended that protocols for DNA testing be 
developed between prosecutors and defence lawyers and that material be 
retained for such testing. The inquiry also approved of the development 
of a national DNA data bank, but did not recommend statutory 
entitlement to DNA testing for those claiming to be wrongly 
convicted.112 The Milgaard Inquiry found that the RCMP lab missed 
discovering DNA material that could have led to Milgaard being more 
quickly exonerated for murder.113  
The lack of specific statutory regulation of post-conviction DNA 
testing is another example of statutes in Canada failing to make 
 
 107. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, ¶ 109 (quoting Peter Neufeld’s testimony to Congress). 
 108. Criminal Code ss.487.04-487.0911(Can.). 
 109. Criminal Code ss.487.08-487.09 (Can.). 
 110. The labs that process DNA are run by the RCMP with separate provincial forensic science 
labs in the largest provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The data bank provides statistics on over 19,000 
offender hits but not on whether the bank has ever produced exonerations. See National DNA Data 
Bank, ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, http://www.nddb-bndg.org/images/stats_e.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2011). 
 111. Pub L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 13701).  
 112. MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 395–96. 
 113. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 808–11. 
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adequate acknowledgement of the possibility of wrongful convictions. It 
may also demonstrate a faith that unelected prosecutors will generally 
consent to DNA testing or that judges will exercise their powers, 
including those relating to the admission of fresh evidence on appeal, to 
ensure that evidence that may contain DNA will be tested. Some 
commentators have argued that Canadians have historically 
demonstrated greater trust of those who hold state power than 
Americans114 and this may help explain the lack of a statutory 
entitlement to DNA evidence that is provided in most American 
jurisdictions.  
D. Appellate Discretion to Enter an Acquittal or to Order a New Trial 
If the accused is successful on the appeal, the appellate court has 
discretion to enter an acquittal or to order a new trial. The choice 
between these two remedies can have a profound effect on the 
wrongfully convicted. An acquittal means that the accused has been 
found not guilty and the presumption of innocence has been restored, 
whereas a new trial order may either place the accused in continued 
jeopardy or result in a prosecutorial stay of proceedings, which may 
produce residual stigma in the case of an accused who has previously 
been convicted. 
There is a long but not invariable practice of entering acquittals in 
cases where the accused likely suffered a miscarriage of justice. The 
Manitoba Court of Appeal entered an acquittal after Thomas 
Sophonow’s third trial, in part because he had already faced three trials 
and served close to four years in jail, and because the identification 
evidence in the case was not reliable.115 In R. v. Hinse, the Supreme 
Court of Canada set aside a stay of proceedings the Quebec Court of 
Appeal entered in a case of a thirty-year-old wrongful robbery 
conviction. It entered an acquittal on the basis that the “evidence could 
not allow a reasonable jury properly instructed to find the appellant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”116 In Re Truscott, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal held that while it might normally order a new trial, an 
acquittal was appropriate given that a new trial on the 1959 murder was 
not possible, a prosecutorial stay would impose continuing stigma on 
Truscott, and it was more probable than not that Truscott would be 
acquitted at a hypothetical new trial.117 
 
 114. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE (1990); DAVID JONES AND DAVID 
KILGOUR UNEASY NEIGHBORS (2007). 
 115. R. v. Sophonow, (1985) 38 Man. R. 2d 198, 202 (C.A.). 
 116. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 3, ¶ 2. 
 117. Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575, ¶ 265. 
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In other miscarriages of justice cases, courts of appeal have been able 
to conclude that an acquittal should be entered because no reasonable 
jury would convict the accused. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal in 
R. v. Walsh, after hearing new evidence from a variety of witnesses and 
examining archival material that should have been disclosed to an 
accused who had served twenty-seven years imprisonment on a murder 
charge, entered an acquittal. It stressed that the prosecutor had agreed 
that the fresh evidence should be admitted, that there was a miscarriage 
of justice, and that a new trial was not feasible.118 The Court of Appeal 
concluded that: 
[I]n view of the fact we have a complete record, we have considered the 
entire case as it was presented to the judge and jury. We have also 
considered the fresh evidence. On the evidence as it now stands, the trial 
record as augmented by the fresh evidence, we are of the opinion that no 
reasonable jury could convict Walsh of murder.119 
In the William Mullins-Johnson case, an acquittal was also entered, 
with the agreement of the Crown, after the court of appeal had 
considered fresh pathological evidence indicating that the cause of the 
death of Mullins-Johnson’s niece was undetermined and that the 
medical evidence did not support the original conviction of murder and 
sexual assault.120  
The practice of entering acquittals is not invariable. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal refused to enter an acquittal when overturning a 1972 
murder conviction in Phillion’s case. The court of appeal stated that a 
new trial was necessary because “depending on how the fresh evidence 
were to unfold at a new trial, it would be open to a jury to reject the 
defence of alibi and conclude, essentially on the basis of the appellant’s 
confessions,” that the accused was guilty. It concluded that “substituting 
a verdict of acquittal on the basis that the fresh evidence is ‘clearly 
decisive’ of innocence is not a tenable position.”121 Phillion had not 
established under the Truscott test that it was more probable than not 
 
 118. Re Walsh, 2008 NBCA 33, ¶ 96 (Can.). 
 119. Id., ¶ 91. 
 120. Re Mullins-Johnson, 2007 ONCA 720 (Can.). For other wrongful convictions stemming 
from Dr. Smith’s flawed forensic pathology testimony where the Court of Appeal entered an acquittal, 
see R. v. Sheratt Robinson, 2009 ONCA 886 (Can.); R. v. C.F., 2010 ONCA 691 (Can.); R. v. C.M., 
2010 ONCA 690 (Can.); R. v. Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120 (Can.); R. v. Brant, 2011 ONCA 362 (Can.). 
For a historical case in which the prosecutor conceded that “Given the Crown’s submissions, it is open 
to the Court to conclude that as matters stand today, no reasonable jury could convict. In the event that 
such determination is made, the appropriate remedy is to enter acquittals on the counts at bar.” R. v. 
Henry 2010 BCCA 462, ¶ 10 (Can.). For another wrongful conviction involving a mistaken 
identification where the prosecutor consented to the entry of an acquittal see R. v. Webber, 2010 ONCA 
4 (Can.). 
 121. Re Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202, ¶ 244 (Can.). 
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that he would be acquitted at a hypothetical new trial, even though there 
was new alibi evidence that “may well have left the jury in a state of 
reasonable doubt . . . ”.122 One judge dissented in this appeal, and would 
have upheld the conviction. As in Truscott, a new trial was impossible 
given the age of the events and the prosecutor subsequently decided to 
withdraw the charge. As discussed above, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
refused to enter an acquittal when it overturned Marquardt’s murder 
conviction, though the prosecutor subsequently withdrew the murder 
charges. 
E. Prosecutorial Conduct at New Trials 
If a new trial, as opposed to an acquittal, is ordered in a case of a 
suspected miscarriage of justice, the prosecutor has the option of 1) 
conducting a new trial, or 2) issuing a prosecutorial stay of proceedings, 
3) withdrawing charges, or 4) of calling no evidence. The previously 
convicted person only receives a formal acquittal if no evidence is 
called. Prosecutors have been surprisingly reluctant to follow this 
approach. In many miscarriage of justice cases, they have simply stayed 
proceedings. In response to recent criticisms of this practice, the more 
recent trend is towards withdrawing charges. 
The Lamer Inquiry concluded that a prosecutorial stay “may leave an 
impression with the public that the charge is merely being ‘postponed’ 
or ‘the authorities,’ in a broad sense, still believe in the validity of the 
charge. That impression is likely to be magnified where, as in this case, 
the accused had already been convicted and spent years in prison prior 
to his successful appeal.”123 Similarly, the Driskell Inquiry expressed 
concerns that a prosecutorial stay leaves “a residual stigma” and is not 
an appropriate remedy when the Minister of Justice has ordered a new 
trial under the petition procedure. It recommended that the preferable 
course in most cases of a suspected miscarriage of justice is for the 
prosecutor to call no evidence so that the accused receives an acquittal 
and is protected by double jeopardy provisions from further 
prosecutions for the alleged offence. Prosecutorial stays should only be 
entered by the Attorney General personally and if there is still an active 
investigation of the formally convicted person.124 A third commission of 
inquiry recognized that a prosecutorial stay in 1992 in Milgaard’s case 
“left him with significant stigma” that was not dispelled until DNA 
exonerated him in 1997, but that it was nevertheless a reasonable 
 
 122. Id. at ¶ 246. 
 123. LAMER INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 317–18. 
 124. DRISKELL INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 129–39. 
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decision.125 The Milgaard commission also endorsed the 
recommendations of the Driskell Inquiry about the limited use of 
prosecutorial stays in cases of suspected miscarriages of justice. 
In light of these criticisms, prosecutors have become more reluctant to 
enter stays in miscarriages of justice cases. The new trend in cases such 
as Marquardt seems to be to withdraw charges, a practice that, like the 
stay, does not result in a formal acquittal. The prosecutor similarly 
withdrew charges in the Phillion case, discussed above. Phillion 
challenged this decision, arguing that he was entitled to an acquittal 
once his 1972 murder conviction had been reversed on the basis of new 
evidence. The subsequent challenge to the prosecutorial withdrawal 
failed, with the judge emphasizing the important role of prosecutorial 
discretion.126 In the end, Canadian victims of wrongful convictions may 
not always receive a formal acquittal,127 let alone a finding of factual 
innocence from the criminal justice system that is formally required for 
compensation. 
F. Petitions to the Federal Minister of Justice When  
Appeals are Exhausted 
If a person’s appeals have been exhausted, the only means to re-open 
a case is to petition the federal Minister of Justice, who is an elected 
official who also serves as the Attorney General of Canada.128 This 
power has been used in a number of high profile cases, including that of 
Marshall examined above. Nevertheless, it is a second best approach 
because the ultimate decision-maker is an elected politician. In addition, 
there are frequent delays that accompany the petition process in part 
because of the onus it places on the petitioner to present new evidence 
and full records of the case and in part because of the investigations that 
are conducted to advise the Minister of Justice. The petition process has 
the potential to trigger investigative powers that can be exercised by the 
Minister of Justice or his or her designate. However, the petitions have 
 
 125. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 336. 
 126. Phillion, 2010 ONSC 1604 (Can.). 
 127. Kyle Unger was, however, acquitted after the Manitoba prosecutor called no evidence after a 
new trial for murder was ordered after DNA revealed that a hair used to convict him did not belong to 
Mr. Unger. A previous Manitoba Inquiry had criticized the use of a prosecutorial stay in another case 
where hair comparison evidence was refuted by DNA testing. Kyle Unger Acquitted of 1990 Killing, 
CBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2009/10/23/mb-unger-
acquitted-manitoba.html. 
 128. Kerry Scullion, Criminal Conviction Review Group, Dept. of Justice, Can., Wrongful 
Convictions and the Criminal Conviction Review Process pursuant to Section 696.1 of the Criminal 
Code of Canada, 46 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 189 (2004); see also Peter H. Howden, 
Judging Errors of Judgment: Accountability, Independence and Vulnerability in a Post-Appellate 
Conviction Review Process, 21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 569 (2002). 
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been characterized as adversarial and reactive by the six commissions of 
inquiry that have all recommended that the procedure for petitions be 
replaced by giving an independent body, similar to the CCRC used in 
England and Wales, power to either refer cases for new appeals or new 
trials. 
The power of the Minister of Justice to re-open a case after appeals 
have been exhausted is based on the royal prerogative of mercy. It was 
recognized in Canada’s first Criminal Code enacted in 1892, which 
provided: 
748. If upon any application for the mercy of the Crown on behalf of any 
person convicted of an indictable offence, the Minister of Justice 
entertains a doubt whether such person ought to have been convicted, he 
may, instead of advising Her Majesty to remit or commute the sentence, 
after such inquiry as he thinks proper, by an order in writing direct a new 
trial at such time and before such court as he may think proper. 
In 1955, the provision was re-worded to indicate the Minister could 
direct a trial or a new appeal in his discretion, as opposed to cases where 
the Minister “entertains a doubt.” The former “doubt” standard both 
provided more statutory guidance to the Minister and accorded with 
basic principles of criminal justice, which require guilt to be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In Canada, the provincial attorneys general conduct most criminal 
prosecutions, but the Attorney General of Canada has some 
prosecutorial responsibilities, for example, with respect to drug and 
terrorism prosecutions. In addition, the Attorney General of Canada 
prosecutes all offences in Canada’s three northern territories. In 
recommending that an independent and permanent commission, such as 
the CCRC, replace the petition process, a number of commissions of 
inquiry have noted that the federal Minister of Justice is in a perceived 
and sometimes real conflict of interest in deciding whether to refer a 
criminal conviction back to the courts. The Milgaard Inquiry 
documented a lack of transparency in the petition process, which saw 
Milgaard’s petition originally denied but then granted after the 
intervention of the Prime Minister. As the inquiry detailed, the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Justice both claimed responsibility for 
having the petition ultimately granted, underlining a lack of 
transparency about how petitions are decided.129 
Until amendments in 2002, the petition procedure was explicitly tied 
to applications for the mercy of the Crown. The relevant provision 
simply granted the Minister the discretion to order a new trial or to refer 
the case to the court of appeal either as a new appeal or on specific 
 
 129. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 373-376. 
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questions. There were no legislated rules to govern the Minister of 
Justice’s exercise of discretion. Nevertheless, the courts held there was 
some duty of fairness that required the Minister to “conduct a 
meaningful review” and provide the occupant with “a reasonable 
opportunity to state his case.”130 At the same time, the courts warned 
that the petition procedure was not an appeal on the merits, there was no 
general right to disclosure of all material the Minister considered in 
making his or her decision and that the duty of fairness was less than 
applied in judicial proceedings.131 Courts consistently deferred to 
Ministerial decisions not to grant petitions.132 
In 1994, Minister of Justice Allan Rock announced a number of 
principles that guided his decision-making under the petition procedure. 
He emphasized that the petition remedy was extraordinary and not 
intended to allow the Minister to substitute his opinion for that of the 
court or jury or to create a fourth level of appeal. Petitions should 
ordinarily be based on new matters that the courts had not considered. 
The Minister would assess the reliability and significance of new 
evidence the applicant placed before the Minister. Although an applicant 
does not have to establish innocence to be successful, the applicant 
would have to establish that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred.133 
The reactive nature of this enterprise was demonstrated in the Milgaard 
Inquiry when it heard the following from a formal federal official: 
Q: . . . A convicted person can’t come to you and say “look, I’d like you 
to investigate, I’m innocent, I don’t know what went wrong but would 
you people please go and investigate this and find out why I was 
wrongfully convicted”?  
A: We would say to that person “that is not the role of the department or 
of the Minister.” Certainly, if you’ve been through the process, sat in on 
your trial, heard the evidence, you’re in the best position to identify to us 
what it is you say constitutes wrongful – or what the errors were and why 
they constitute a miscarriage of justice.  
Q: And what you are telling us, then, it would be incumbent upon Mr. 
Milgaard and/or his counsel to identify significant grounds that might 
provide a basis for a remedy under Section 690?  
 
 130. Thatcher v. Canada, [1997] 1 F.C. 289 at 297 [12]. 
 131. Id. at ¶ 12–13. 
 132. Id.; W.R. v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1999] FC 1059; Bonamy v. Canada, (Att’y Gen.) 
2001 FCT 798; Daouluv v. Attorney General, (Canada), 2008 FC 544; Bilodeau v. Minister of Justice, 
2008 QCCS 1036, [2008] J.Q.no.2098., affirmed in Bilodeau c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), 2009 
QCCA 746, [2009] J.Q. no 3472. 
 133. Patricia Braiden & Joan Brockman, Remedying Wrongful Convictions Through Applications 
to the Minister of Justice Under Section 690 of the Criminal Code, 17 WINDSOR Y.B., ACCESS JUST. 3, 
9–10 (1999). 
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A: Yes.134 
In other words, the Minister of Justice and his or her staff would react 
and evaluate new evidence that was put before them by a convicted 
person, but they would not conduct proactive investigations to determine 
if new evidence, not known to the convicted person, existed. 
The 1994 principles established a number of significant hurdles for an 
applicant to pass before the Minister of Justice orders that the courts 
reconsider a conviction. The first hurdle was to produce new evidence; 
the second hurdle was to convince the Minister of Justice that the new 
evidence was relevant and reliable and the third hurdle was to convince 
the Minister of Justice that an extraordinary remedy of a new trial or 
appeal was necessary because a miscarriage of justice likely occurred. 
These principles have now largely been codified in the 2002 reforms. 
In 2002, the prerogative of mercy provisions were replaced with a 
new procedure under ss. 696.1-6 of the Criminal Code. The new 
procedures were designed to make the petition process more transparent 
by providing the Minister of Justice with legal standards for making his 
or her decisions. The most important provision is s. 696.3(3)(a), which 
provides that the Minister is to direct a new trial or an appeal “if the 
Minister is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a 
miscarriage of justice likely occurred.” This standard seems higher than 
the comparable English standard. The CCRC will refer a case for a new 
appeal if there is “a real possibility” that the conviction would not be 
upheld if referred to the court of appeal.135 A reasonable likelihood is a 
higher standard than a real possibility. As discussed above, the Canadian 
legislation does not define a miscarriage of justice, but courts have 
interpreted it in a manner similar to the English standard that focuses on 
the safety of convictions as opposed to proven innocence. 
Justice Kaufman, in his exhaustive report for the Minister of Justice 
in connection with Stephen Truscott’s application under this new 
provision, stressed that a miscarriage of justice would occur both if the 
conviction of a factually innocent person was established, but also if 
new evidence could reasonably have affected the verdict. In the latter 
circumstances “it would be unfair to maintain the accused’s conviction 
without an opportunity for the trier of fact to consider new evidence.”136 
In reversing Truscott’s conviction, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
subsequently indicated that a miscarriage of justice would include both 
trials that have been unfair and trials “where there was no unfairness at 
trial, but evidence was admitted on appeal that placed the reliability of 
 
 134. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 358. 
 135. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995 c 35 s. 13; see also R. v. CCRC ex parte Pearson, [1999] 3 All 
E.R. 498 (Can.). 
 136. F. KAUFMAN, REPORT ON THE STEPHEN TRUSCOTT APPLICATION, ¶ 164 (2004). 
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the conviction in serious doubt.”137 In other words, a miscarriage of 
justice is a broad term. It can apply to both an unfair trial and a trial 
where the factual reliability of the conviction is in doubt. 
In deciding whether to re-open a conviction by ordering a new trial or 
a new appeal, s. 696.4 instructs that the Minister of Justice shall take 
into account all matters that the Minister considers relevant, including: 
1. whether the application is supported by new matters of significance 
that were not considered by the courts or previously considered by the 
Minister in an application in relation to the same conviction or finding 
under Part XXIV; 
2. the relevance and reliability of information that is presented in 
connection with the application; and 
3. the fact that an application under this Part is not intended to serve as a 
further appeal and any remedy available on such an application is an 
extraordinary remedy. 
This section codifies many of the principles contained in Minister of 
Justice Rock’s 1994 statement. It does not require that new evidence or 
new matters be presented, but as a practical matter this is almost always 
required, given that the petition procedure is not intended to be a further 
level of appeal. Indeed, the federal Department of Justice’s website 
presents the need for new matters to be presented as a requirement.138 
The internal procedures that are used to decide an application are: (1) 
a preliminary assessment to determine whether there are new matters 
that provide an air of reality to the claim of a miscarriage of justice; (2) 
an investigation in which counsel within the department verifies the 
information, collects new information, and makes a recommendation to 
the Minister; (3) preparation of an investigative summary that is 
disclosed to the applicant for comments; and (4) the preparation of final 
legal advice for the Minister of Justice’s decision. There is a special 
advisor within the department who offers advice at various stages of the 
investigation. The Milgaard Inquiry, however, concluded that the post-
2002 changes have not changed the “reactive” nature of the process 
 
 137. 2007 ONCA 575, ¶ 110 (Can.). 
 138. “An application for ministerial review must be supported by ‘new matters of significance’—
generally new information that has surfaced since the trial and appeal and therefore has not been 
presented to the courts, and has not been considered by the Minister on a prior application. Only after a 
thorough review of the new matters of significance will the Minister be in a position to determine 
whether there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred.” DEPT. OF 
JUST., CAN., ANNUAL REPORT, ADDRESSING POSSIBLE MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/ccr-rc/rep08-rap08/02.html; DEPT. OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT, 
APPLICATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL REVIEW—MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/ccr-rc/rep10-rap10/index.html. But for arguments that a conviction will 
be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Group within the Department of Justice even if an applicant 
does not identify a new matter see Narissa Somji, A Comparative Study of the Post-Conviction Review 
Process in Canada and the United Kingdom, 58 Crim. L.Q. 136, 167 (2012). 
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because it still relies on the applicant identifying new evidence.139  
The 2002 changes allow the Minister of Justice to appoint individuals 
to investigate claims of wrongful conviction. Those individuals must be 
retired judges, members of the bar, or those with similar qualifications. 
They have powers to take evidence, issue subpoenas, and compel people 
to give evidence.140 These powers are broad and, unlike the English 
CCRC, include a power to obtain documents from private persons. 
These delegated authorities, however, only make recommendations to 
the Minister of Justice about whether a conviction should be referred 
back to the courts and they do not make the actual referral decision. 
From November 2002, when the new provisions came into force, to 
March 31, 2012, the Minister of Justice has made decisions on eighty-
seven applications. Most applications were closed after a preliminary 
assessment on the basis that there were no grounds for further 
investigation. The remaining applications went to investigation, with 
thirteen of those cases (15% of total applications) being referred back to 
the courts. These statistics suggest that the Minister of Justice refers a 
greater percentage of applications (15% compared to 4%) to the courts 
than the English CCRC. At the same time, however, the CCRC receives 
many more applications each year than the Canadian Minister of 
Justice.141  
The federal Minister of Justice is more risk adverse than the CCRC in 
the cases it decides to refer back to the courts. In twelve of the thirteen 
cases that the Minister has referred since 2002, the applicant has 
received a favourable remedy resulting in freedom.142 In contrast, over a 
third of the cases referred by the CCRC to the court of appeal are not 
overturned on appeal. This significant difference could be explained by 
a number of factors. One is that the Canadian Minister has to apply a 
more difficult standard of a reasonable likelihood that a miscarriage of 
 
 139. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 364. 
 140. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.696.2. 
 141.  The Criminal Case Review Commissions receives about 1,000 applications each year 
whereas the Canadian Minister of Justice receives about 20 a year. See Graham Zellick, Facing up to 
Miscarriages of Justice, 31 Man.L.J. 555, 556 (2006); Narissa Somji, A Comparative Study of the Post-
Conviction Review Process in Canada and the United Kingdom, 58 Crim. L.Q. 136, 188 (2012). 
 142. The prosecutor stayed proceedings when the Minister ordered a new trial in the cases of 
Steven Kaminski (sexual assault); Darcy Bjorge (stolen property); Daniel Wood (murder); James 
Driskell (murder); and L.G.P. (sexual assault).  The prosecutor withdrew murder charges against Romeo 
Phillion. Acquittals were obtained in the cases of Steven Truscott (murder); William Mullins-Johnson 
(murder); Andre Tremblay (murder); Erin Walsh (murder); Kyle Unger (murder); and D.R.S (sexual 
assault). Rodney Cain, originally convicted of second degree murder, was convicted of manslaughter at 
the new trial ordered by the Minister of Justice. See Kent Roach, An Independent Commission to Review 
Claims of Wrongful Convictions: Lessons from North Carolina?, 58 Crim. L.Q, 283, 290 (2012). This is 
an updated count that includes the recent entry of an acquittal of sexual assault on a Minister of Justice’s 
reference in R. v. D.R.S., 2013 ABCA 18. (Can.). The new evidence in this case was a recantation by 
the complainant who was nine years old at the time of the allegations. 
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justice has occurred, whereas the English CCRC applies a slightly lower 
standard of a real possibility that the conviction will not be sustained if a 
new appeal is heard. Another possible factor is that the Canadian 
Minister is a politician with direct responsibilities for the criminal 
justice system, whereas the members of the CCRC are independent 
appointees. The many hurdles that the Canadian petition procedure 
imposes on applicants results in a much smaller number of applications 
than the CCRC model in England and Wales. The Canadian applications 
are, however, more likely to be referred back to the courts. In almost 
every case where the Minister of Justice makes a referral, the courts or 
prosecutors agree that a conviction cannot be maintained. In contrast, 
the courts uphold convictions in a significant minority of cases that the 
CCRC refers back to the courts.  
The 2002 legislation does not provide guidance about how the 
Minister of Justice is to decide between ordering a new trial or a new 
appeal. In recent years, the Minister of Justice’s preferred remedy is to 
refer a case for an appeal, as opposed to a new trial. A new appeal is 
especially useful in historical cases, where a new trial is not possible and 
will only result in a prosecutorial stay or withdrawal of charges. As 
discussed above, appeal courts can consider new evidence and even hear 
testimony or appoint special commissioners to inquire into defined 
matters. Starting with the 2007 Truscott reference, the courts of appeal 
have also been willing to decide whether an acquittal is more probable 
than not at a hypothetical new trial and, if so, enter an acquittal. The 
trend towards relying on new appeals as opposed to new trials also 
mirrors the practice where the CCRC must refer a case to the court of 
appeal and is not able to direct a new trial. The Royal Commission on 
the Marshall case, however, criticized the use of an appeal remedy 
because it places the onus on the accused and could result in a new trial. 
At the same time, however, the order of a new trial in a number of 
miscarriage of justice cases resulted in prosecutorial stays that, as 
discussed above, have been criticized by other inquiries for imposing a 
residual stigma on those who have been previously convicted in serious 
cases. 
There have been many criticisms of the delay in processing petition 
applications, which in some cases can take years. Clive Walker and 
Kathryn Campbell have concluded that even after the 2002 reforms, the 
Canadian petition procedure remains “cumbersome, onerous and 
lengthy” and “ultimately ineffective for most wrongly convicted 
individuals.”143 In a number of cases, the courts have responded to this 
 
 143. Clive Walker & Kathryn Campbell, The CCRC as an Option for Canada: Forwards or 
Backwards?, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT? 191 (M. 
Naughton ed., 2010). They conclude that while an independent commission such as the CCRC would be 
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delay by granting an applicant bail pending the Minister of Justice’s 
final decision.144 This is an important act of judicial creativity to respond 
to delays in the petition procedure and the plight of the wrongfully 
convicted.145 
G. Summary 
The two major methods of overturning wrongful convictions in 
Canada are the use of appeals, including appeals out of time and appeals 
in which fresh evidence is introduced, and petitions to the Minister of 
Justice for a new trial or appeal once all appeals have been exhausted. 
As outlined above, Canada has a relatively generous appeal structure. 
Convictions can be overturned if the guilty verdict was unreasonable, 
based on an error of law or if it constitutes a miscarriage of justice 
broadly defined to include both unfair and unreliable verdicts. Courts 
are also relatively generous in allowing appeals out of time and 
accepting fresh evidence on appeal. At the same time, however, the 
Canadian courts will not overturn convictions simply because there is a 
lurking doubt about guilt. They are more deferential to convictions by 
juries than convictions by judges sitting alone. They can also uphold 
convictions based on legal error if they determine that the error is 
harmless because no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has 
occurred.  
The second method for overturning convictions is less generous and 
more demanding. It requires an applicant who has exhausted all appeals 
to convince the Minister of Justice, an elected politician with 
responsibility for a minority of all Canadian criminal prosecutions, that 
a miscarriage of justice likely has occurred. The Minister of Justice will 
only order a new appeal or a new trial as an extraordinary remedy and, 
generally, on the basis of new evidence. The Minister of Justice retains 
this power despite recommendations by six inquiries that the Minister’s 
powers be transferred to an independent commission, as is the case in 
England and Wales, Scotland, Norway, and North Carolina.146 
Relatively few convicted people apply to the Minister of Justice, 
 
an improvement in Canada, that a Canadian version of the CCRC should play more of a policy and 
inspectorate role than the CCRC and take a more holistic approach to the criminal justice system. Id. at 
203–04. 
 144. R. v. Phillion, [2003] O.J. No. 3422 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of Just.); R. v. Driskell, 2004 MBQB 
3 (Can.); R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB 238 (Can.); Ostrowski v. The Queen et al., 2009 MBQB 327 (Can.). 
 145. The Criminal Code only explicitly authorizes the grant of bail pending appeal and not 
pending a decision of the Minister of Justice under s.696.1-6. See Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 
1985, c. C-46 s.679. 
 146. See generally Kent Roach, The Role of Innocence Commissions, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89 
(2010). 
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perhaps because of the difficulty of producing new evidence that will 
satisfy the Minister. It can take years for the Minister to make a 
decision, especially if there is an investigation. Fortunately, the courts 
have mitigated the effects of this delay in some cases by granting 
applicants bail pending the Minister’s decision. The Minister of Justice 
refers about 15% of all applications back to the courts, either for a new 
trial or a new appeal. The Minister of Justice is quite risk adverse in 
exercising his or her discretion because in all but one case since 2002, 
the referred cases have been cases with compelling new evidence that 
resulted in either courts entering acquittals or prosecutors staying or 
withdrawing charges. 
V. CAUSES OF AND REMEDIES FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
The best information about the causes of wrongful convictions in 
Canada, as well as the most frequent source for proposals about how to 
prevent wrongful convictions, come from the seven public inquiries that 
have examined particularly notorious wrongful convictions. As will be 
seen, these inquiries have, at various times, examined the role of all 
major criminal justice actors in wrongful convictions. They have also 
made many recommendations about how to decrease the risk of 
wrongful convictions. Provincial governments, responsible for the 
administration of criminal justice, have appointed all the inquiries. 
Many of the inquiries’ unimplemented recommendations have been 
made to the federal government. It should be recalled that the federal 
government in Canada has exclusive jurisdiction over the rules of 
criminal procedure and criminal evidence. 
A. The Police: The Problem of Tunnel Vision  
The police play a critical role in almost all wrongful convictions. In 
the Marshall case discussed above, the police virtually framed Marshall, 
using oppressive tactics against young and unstable witnesses until they 
were prepared to perjure themselves and falsely testify that they saw 
Marshall stab Seale. The local police also persisted in their belief that 
Marshall had to be guilty, even after a companion of the real killer came 
forth shortly after Marshall’s 1971 conviction and told them that 
Marshall was innocent. 
Many commissions of inquiry that have examined wrongful 
convictions have found that the police were subject to “tunnel vision” in 
which they prematurely settled on a person as a suspect, did not 
adequately explore other hypotheses, and interpreted ambiguous, and 
even contradictory evidence, as consistent with the accused’s guilt. The 
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inquiry that examined Guy Paul Morin’s wrongful conviction found that 
the investigators settled on him as the prime suspect in part because they 
considered him “odd.” The Commission of Inquiry recommended that 
police be trained about the dangers of tunnel vision, which it defined as 
“the single minded and overly narrow focus on an investigation or 
prosecutorial theory so as to unreasonably colour the evaluation of 
information received and one’s conduct in response to the 
information.”147 
In the Thomas Sophonow case, the accused was reluctant to disclose 
his alibi to the police for fear that they would investigate it in a manner 
so as to discredit it. The police eventually investigated the alibi in an 
unsatisfactory manner. The police provided positive feedback to 
eyewitnesses who identified the suspect, they told the suspect 
information that would only be known to the killer, and they attempted 
to bolster their case by using evidence from unreliable jailhouse 
informers. The same police force, however, eventually undertook the re-
investigation that, a decade later, cleared Sophonow of the murder. The 
inquiry recommended that a double blind procedure be used for 
eyewitness identifications, that jailhouse informers not be used, that 
exhibits and notebooks be retained for disclosure to the accused, that 
interviews involving alibi witnesses be videotaped, and that the police 
receive annual lectures or courses on the dangers of tunnel vision.148 
A Newfoundland inquiry found that the police had engaged in tunnel 
vision in two cases where there were subsequent DNA exonerations. In 
one case, the police quickly decided that the accused was responsible for 
his mother’s death, questioned witnesses in a manner suggestive of his 
guilt, and exaggerated the importance of evidence consistent with guilt 
and minimized the importance of evidence inconsistent with guilt. The 
commission also found that noble cause corruption – the sense that 
noble ends can justify any means – heightened the distorting effects of 
tunnel vision. It recommended recording interviews in major cases, 
using independent operators for polygraphs, and having independent 
prosecutors carefully review the case developed by the police. The 
commission also recommended that courts be more prepared to direct a 
verdict of acquittal in weak cases that were prosecuted.149  
Not all inquiries that have examined wrongful convictions have found 
that the police engaged in tunnel vision. The inquiry into Milgaard’s 
case found that “tunnel vision, negligence and misconduct have been 
alleged but not shown,”150 even though it also found that a polygraph 
 
 147. MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 1134. 
 148. SOPHONOW INQUIRY, supra note 6. 
 149. LAMER INQUIRY, supra note 6. 
 150. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 304. 
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operator pressured young people to support Milgaard’s guilt. The 
inquiry found no tunnel vision, even though the police did not focus on 
the real perpetrator who had committed similar crimes in the same area 
where Milgaard was wrongly alleged to have murdered a young woman. 
This inquiry’s approach underlines the danger of seeing tunnel vision as 
a form of misconduct rather than a systemic problem, especially in cases 
where the police are investigating a high profile crime. 
Although Canadian inquiries have frequently identified tunnel vision, 
they have yet to develop effective remedies to counteract this complex 
process within policing organizations. The inquiries have recommended 
that superiors regularly review police investigations and that police 
officers receive better training, but they have not developed 
organizational solutions that would counter common presumptions of 
guilt in policing.151 The inquiries have also not recommended 
institutional reforms, such as those relating to building quality control 
units or contrarian devils advocates within police forces.152 
The inquiries have tended to stress remedies that are external to police 
forces as a means to counteract police tunnel vision. These remedies 
include full disclosure to the accused of all relevant information the 
police hold, review of cases by independent prosecutors, decreased use 
of jailhouse informers to shore up weak cases, and increased judicial use 
of the directed verdict of an acquittal. A report on behalf of all 
prosecutors in Canada has stressed that prosecutors can counteract 
police tunnel vision by exercising independent, quasi-judicial discretion 
in deciding whether to proceed with the case. The report also suggested 
that, where feasible, prosecutors separate from those that advised the 
police during the investigation should review charges. Second opinions, 
case review, and contrarian thinking should be encouraged within the 
prosecutor’s office.153 These prosecutorial checks are especially 
important because tunnel vision may be difficult to detect at the trial 
stage. There are restrictions on calling evidence at trial that indicates a 
third party may have been responsible for a crime.154 In addition, an 
accused who alleges tunnel vision at trial opens the door for the state to 
respond with prejudicial hearsay evidence to support the police’s 
 
 151. Dianne Martin, The Police Role in Wrongful Convictions: An International Comparative 
Study, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 77 (Westervelt & Humphrey eds. 
2005). 
 152. John Epp, Penetrating Investigative Practice Post Morin, 31 U.B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997); 
Bruce MacFarlane, Convicting the Innocent: A Triple Failure of the Justice System, 31 MAN. L.J. 403 
(2006). 
 153. FTP HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMM. WORKING GROUP, CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT 
ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 35-41(2004). See also FTP HEADS OF 
PROSECUTIONS COMM., THE PATH TO JUSTICE 54 (2011). 
 154. Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5. 
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investigation.155 
B. The Police: Identification Procedures 
As in the United States, flawed identifications are a leading cause of 
wrongful convictions in Canada. The Sophonow Commission focused 
on the frailties of eyewitness identification and recommended the use of 
a double blind identification system, and the sequential and recorded 
presentation of at least ten photos in photo line-ups. Although some 
police forces follow these recommendations as best practices, there are 
no legislated identification procedures in Canada. Without legislative 
guidance, many of the police oriented reforms to prevent wrongful 
conviction depend on individual police forces voluntarily implementing 
reforms. Exclusive federal jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure 
may have inhibited legislative experimentation of the type available in 
Australia or the United States where the states can enact their own 
criminal law reforms sometimes in response to local wrongful 
convictions. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held in 2007 that police forces can be 
sued for negligent forms of investigation. Nevertheless, the Court held 
that the police were not negligent in a case where an Aboriginal man, 
Jason Hill, was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned for twenty months 
for a robbery he did not commit. Mr. Hill was identified in a twelve 
person photo line-up that included him and eleven Caucasian foils and 
was conducted after Mr. Hill’s photo had been released to the media. 
The identification procedure was also not conducted in a double blind 
manner and was conducted on two witnesses at the same time. Although 
the police did not engage in good practices as measured by today’s 
standards, the Court concluded that there was no negligence because the 
flawed photo line-up did not breach standards that applied in 1995 when 
the false identification was obtained.156 The Court also found no 
negligence, even though the police did not attempt to halt the 
prosecution when similar robberies continued after Hill’s arrest.157 Even 
if there is more success in subsequent cases, civil litigation is an 
indirect, diffuse, and uncertain means of ensuring that the police use 
proper identification procedures compared to legislated standards. 
 
 155. Van, 2005 SCC 5. 
 156. Hamilton Wentworth Police, 2007 SCC 41, ¶ 78. 
 157. The Court concluded, “This was not a case of tunnel-vision or blinding oneself to the facts,” 
in part because in 1995 “awareness of the danger of wrongful convictions was less acute than it is today. 
There was credible evidence supporting the charge.” Id. at ¶ 88. 
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C. The Police: Interrogation Procedures 
The Supreme Court has recognized that false confessions are a cause 
of wrongful convictions. The Court stressed that one of the purposes of 
the traditional common law rule that requires the prosecution to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that confessions obtained by persons in 
authority are voluntary is to protect against the danger of false 
confessions.158 At the same time, however, the Court refused to exclude 
confessions taken after a prolonged interrogation that caused the 
accused much emotional distress, in part because of his fear that the 
police would interrogate his fiancé.159 The Court made the questionable 
assumption that “false confessions are rarely the product of proper 
police techniques.”160 It also ruled that while recording of confessions 
was advisable, a failure to record an interrogation did not render a 
confession inadmissible.161 Serious concerns have been raised that the 
test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is not sensitive 
enough to characteristics of the accused, such as mental disabilities or 
instabilities and drug withdrawal, which could help produce false 
confessions.162 
The Supreme Court has held that confessions are still admissible even 
if the accused has asserted his preference to remain silent163 and made 
numerous requests to see his lawyer, so long as the suspect has been 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer. The Court also 
held that there is no constitutional requirement that a defence lawyer be 
present during an interrogation.164 These cases suggest that courts are 
often reluctant to exclude confessions perhaps because of fears of 
preventing the police from obtaining legitimate confessions and perhaps 
because of the severity of exclusion as a remedy. In addition, the courts 
are even more reluctant to exclude confessions that may be false 
because of personal characteristics, such as a mental disability. The 
leading case suggests that statements from the accused are admissible as 
long as they have a basic operating mind.165 The courts have admitted 
confessions from people with significant mental disabilities because 
they have concluded that the police have acted properly in the 
 
 158. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38. 
 159. Id. at ¶ 104. 
 160. Id. at ¶ 45. 
 161. Id. at ¶ 46. 
 162. Christopher Sherrin, False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law, 30 QUEENS L.J. 
601 (2005). 
 163. Singh, 2007 SCC 48. 
 164. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35. 
 165. R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914 (Can.).  
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interrogation process.166 
The Canadian courts have attempted to encourage the police to 
videotape interrogations, but they have stopped short of requiring such 
recording as a pre-requisite to admission.167 This presents a danger that a 
false confession may ring true because it includes “hold back” 
information only known to the real perpetrator and the police. 
Parliament has not legislated any recording requirements, or indeed any 
other procedures, for interviewing adults.168 As with identification 
procedures, this means that only the courts enforce the rules designed to 
prevent false confessions. As suggested above, courts are reluctant to 
exclude confessions even if they are obtained after intense interrogations 
or from those with significant mental disabilities or mental health issues. 
Even the limited protections against false confessions, the 
voluntariness rule and the right to counsel offer are not available when 
suspects do not know that they are speaking to police officers. Police 
forces in Canada have frequently engaged in expensive, prolonged, and 
sophisticated “Mr. Big” operations, where they pose as criminals and 
hold out a lucrative life style to a suspect if they admit to committing a 
crime as a prerequisite to joining the fake criminal organization. The 
intensity of some of the operations can be seen as a form of tunnel 
vision in cases where the police are convinced of the suspect’s guilt, but 
do not have enough independent evidence to convict. There is also a 
danger that the suspect may be given hold back information known only 
to the perpetrator during these operations, which are not always 
recorded or are recorded selectively. The Supreme Court has held that 
the confessions rule does not apply to these operations.169 Other courts 
have refused to admit expert evidence about the dangers and 
mechanisms of false confessions in Mr. Big cases.170 One recent case, 
however, has excluded confessions obtained through an intensive “Mr. 
Big” operation, in large part because of the risk of a wrongful conviction 
based on unreliable evidence.171  
A Mr. Big operation has been associated with at least one wrongful 
 
 166. Kent Roach & Andrea Bailey, The Relevance of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder in 
Canadian Criminal Law From Investigation to Sentencing, 42 U.B.C.L. REV. 1, 12-28, (2009) 
(outlining cases where judges have accepted statements that may have been influenced by brain injuries 
caused by fetal alcohol spectrum disorder). 
 167. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38. 
 168. The Youth Criminal Justice Act ss.25-26, 146 does provide some additional safeguards 
relating to the right to counsel and the right of a parent to be present, but does not require the recording 
of interrogations of young persons. 
 169. R. v. Hodgson, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449 (Can.); Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5 (Can.).  
 170. R. v. Osmar, 2007 ONCA 50 (Can.); R. v. Bonisteel, (2008) BCCA 344 (Can.); R. v. 
Jeanvenne, 2011 ONSC 7244.  
 171. R. v. Hart, 2012 NLCA 61, ¶¶ 168, 213, 260 (CanLII), available at http://canlii.ca/t/fsr1k. 
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conviction. Kyle Unger was convicted of a brutal murder on the basis of 
hair comparison evidence, testimony from a jailhouse informer, and 
confessions he made during a Mr. Big operation. His conviction was 
affirmed in 1993, with the Manitoba Court of Appeal refusing to 
exclude the confession obtained from the Mr. Big operation.172 In 2005, 
Unger was granted bail pending his successful application to the 
Minister of Justice to re-open his conviction. The judge who granted bail 
noted that the hair comparison was disproved by DNA. The judge also 
expressed concerns about the reliability of the confessions obtained in 
the Mr. Big Operation. The judge observed that Unger, who was 
unemployed, in part because he was suspected of the killing, confessed 
to the killing only after “being wined, dined, and shown large sums of 
money.”173 The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered a new trial, at 
which Unger was acquitted, but the government has refused to provide 
compensation because of his confessions made during the Mr. Big 
operation, even though the details of those confessions have been 
proven to be false. Mr. Unger is now suing police and prosecutors 
involved in his wrongful conviction.174 
D. Prosecutorial Conduct: The Independent and Quasi-Judicial 
Role of Prosecutors 
Prosecutors in Canada are all appointed officials who do not stand for 
election. They are supposed to be interested in seeing that justice is 
done. In other words, they should not be simple adversaries concerned 
with obtaining a conviction.175 Both the Marshall and the Lamer 
Commissions of Inquiry called for the creation of  independent Director 
of Public Prosecutions systems as a means to re-enforce the 
independence of prosecutors. Such systems now exist in both provinces, 
as well as in other provinces and at the federal level. Any 
communication from the Attorney General, who is an elected politician 
who sits in Cabinet, to the Director of Public Prosecutions would have 
to be published and disclosed. The Director of Public Prosecutions holds 
office in good behaviour for a guaranteed term. The Lamer Commission 
stressed that independent prosecutors should serve as a check on police 
investigations and tunnel vision that could result in wrongful 
 
 172. R. v. Unger, 1993 CanLII 4409 (MB CA), available at http://canlii.ca/t/1pfk2. 
 173. R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB 238, ¶¶ 17–19. 
 174. Unger Won’t Get Compensation: Minister, CBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2009), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2009/10/23/mb-compensation-unger-chomiak-manitoba.html; 
Kyle Unger files 14.5 million wrongful conviction suit, CBC News (Sept, 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2011/09/21/kyle-unger-wrongful-conviction-lawsuit.html. 
 175. R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R. 16 (Can.). 
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convictions.  
Canada’s reliance on appointed prosecutors who have autonomy from 
political interference allows prosecutors, in some cases, to agree to 
procedures designed to correct wrongful convictions. For example, the 
prosecutor in the 1983 Marshall appeal persisted in making a joint 
submission that Marshall’s 1971 murder conviction should be quashed, 
despite receiving some resistance from higher officials. In many of the 
cases stemming from the flawed forensic pathology of Dr. Smith, the 
prosecutor has agreed to appeals out of time, the admission of fresh 
evidence, and the quashing of convictions. There are a number of non-
DNA cases where Canadian prosecutors have agreed not only to the 
quashing of a wrongful conviction, but the entry of an acquittal.176 
The quasi-judicial role of the prosecutor as a Minister of Justice 
manifests itself not only in the treatment of individual cases but in 
systemic matters. In some provinces, prosecutors have agreed to conduct 
proactive audits of cases involving suspect forms of evidence or the 
involvement of criminal justice actors that have played a role in 
wrongful convictions. Such audits are a promising alternative to reliance 
on the adversarial system as a means to discover wrongful convictions. 
Prosecutors in Canada have also taken some proactive responsibility on 
policy matters relating to wrongful convictions. A national task force of 
prosecutorial officials issued a lengthy report in 2004 based in large part 
on the findings of Canada’s inquiries into wrongful convictions. This 
report was also supported by scholarship by Bruce MacFarlane, Q.C., 
who was the most senior civil servant in Manitoba responsible for 
justice.177 The same national task force of senior prosecutors issued a 
revised version of the report in 2011.178 Canadian prosecutors deserve 
praise both for recognizing wrongful convictions in many individual 
cases and for taking a policy interest in the prevention of wrongful 
convictions. 
 
 176. R. v. Henry, 2010 BCCA 462 (Can.); R. v. Webber 2010 ONCA 4 (Can.). 
 177. MacFarlane’s work was subsequently published. Bruce MacFarlane, Convicting the 
Innocent: A Triple Failure of Criminal Justice, 31 Man.L.J.403 (2006). 
 178. FTP HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMM. WORKING GROUP, CAN., DEPT OF JUSTICE, REPORT 
ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 35-41 (2004), available at http://www.justice. 
gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/pmj-pej/pmj-pej.pdf; FPT HEADS OF PROSECUTION, THE PATH TO JUSTICE: 
PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2011), available at http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/ptj-
spj/ptj-spj-eng.pdf. But see Christopher Sherrin, Comment in the Report on the Prevention of 
Miscarriages of Justice, 52 CRIM. L.Q, 140 (2007) for some criticism of the prosecutors report. In their 
latest report, the prosecutors consider prior criticisms of their earlier report but still disapprove of expert 
evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification while conceding that such expert knowledge can be 
used in the training of police and prosecutors. They also continue to recommend that only interrogations 
in cases of considerable violence be recorded. THE PATH TO JUSTICE 76, 94 (2011). To its credit, the 
new report does discuss the problem of the innocent pleading guilty and states that “the Subcommittee 
wishes to reiterate that all participants in the criminal justice system must be vigilant to guard against 
creating an environment in which innocent people are induced to plead guilty.” Id. at 207. 
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E. Prosecutorial Conduct: Disclosure 
An important factor in many wrongful convictions has been the 
failure of prosecutors to disclose all relevant material in their 
possession. As discussed earlier, the Marshall Commission of Inquiry 
found that a failure of the Crown to disclose inconsistent statements 
made by lying witnesses was an important factor in Marshall’s wrongful 
conviction. In addition, a companion of the real killer told the police that 
Marshall was not the killer shortly after Marshall’s conviction—but this 
critical information was not disclosed by either the police or the 
prosecutor to Marshall or his lawyer. In response to these findings, the 
Commission of Inquiry recommended that Parliament amend the 
Criminal Code to place a continuing statutory disclosure duty on the 
prosecution. As is, unfortunately, often the case, legislative reform to 
minimize the risk of wrongful convictions was not a priority and 
Parliament has yet to enact a statutory code of disclosure. Indeed, 
Parliament’s actions in this area have only sought to place limits on the 
disclosure of therapeutic records of complainants in sexual assault 
cases.179  
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the landmark case of 
R. v. Stinchcombe.180 Justice Sopinka, for a unanimous Court, stated: 
The right to make full answer and defence is one of the pillars of criminal 
justice on which we heavily depend to ensure that the innocent are not 
convicted. Recent events have demonstrated that the erosion of this right 
due to non-disclosure was an important factor in the conviction and 
incarceration of an innocent person. In the Royal Commission on the 
Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Vol. 1: Findings and 
Recommendations (1989) (the “Marshall Commission Report”), the 
Commissioners found that prior inconsistent statements were not 
disclosed to the defence. This was an important contributing factor in the 
miscarriage of justice which occurred and led the Commission to state 
that “anything less than complete disclosure by the Crown falls short of 
decency and fair play” (Vol. 1 at p. 238).181 
The Court based the broad disclosure obligation placed on the 
prosecutor (frequently called the Crown in Canada) on the idea that the 
prosecutor was not a pure adversary and was interested in ensuring 
justice rather than winning. The new constitutional rule of disclosure 
was broader than the statutory rule the Marshall commission proposed 
because the new rule applied to all relevant information regardless of 
whether it was classified as exculpatory or inculpatory and regardless of 
 
 179. This legislation was upheld under the Charter in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (Can.). 
 180. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. 
 181. Id. 
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whether it related to a person that the prosecutor proposed to call as a 
witness. The only exceptions the Court recognized were for evidentiary 
privileges, such as the informer privilege and the timing of the 
disclosure. Finally, the Court made clear that the duty of disclosure was 
a continuing one. 
Subsequent decisions have continued to define disclosure rights 
broadly to include relevant material that might open up lines of inquiry 
for the accused.182 The obligation to disclose relevant information also 
entails a duty to preserve such information.183 In 2003, the Supreme 
Court observed that the idea that disclosure was simply “an act of 
goodwill” and not a right, “played a significant part in catastrophic 
judicial errors” that resulted in wrongful convictions.184 A 2009 decision 
has affirmed that the police have a duty under Stinchcombe to disclose 
relevant material to the Crown prosecutor and that, in some cases, the 
duty may extend to disciplinary records of a police officer.185 In that 
case, the Court also indicated while the accused must request disclosure, 
the Crown must disclose not only the evidence it will introduce but “any 
information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it 
may assist the accused in the exercise of the right to make full answer 
and defence” so long as it is “not clearly irrelevant, privileged or its 
disclosure is otherwise governed by law.” The Crown’s duty may 
require it to obtain relevant information from other state agencies. 
Finally, “the Crown’s obligation survives the trial and, in the appellate 
context, the scope of relevant information therefore includes any 
information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it 
may assist the appellant in prosecuting an appeal.”186 The experience of 
wrongful convictions and a desire to prevent them has decisively shaped 
the Supreme Court’s approach to constitutional disclosure obligations. 
F. Jailhouse Informers 
Jailhouse informers with incentives to lie have played a role in a 
number of wrongful convictions. The Morin Inquiry found that two 
jailhouse informers used to bolster the murder prosecution against 
Morin were utterly unreliable. It stopped short of recommending a 
complete ban on the use of jailhouse informer. Instead, the Inquiry 
recommended that a committee of senior prosecutors approve any use of 
jailhouse informers, a reform that was subsequently introduced in 
 
 182. R. v. Dixon, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244 (Can.); R. v. Tallifer, 2003 SCC 70 (Can.). 
 183. R. v. La, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680 (Can.). 
 184. Tallifer, 2003 SCC 70, ¶ 1. 
 185. R. v. McNeil, [2009] S.C.R. 66 (Can.). 
 186. Id. at ¶ 17–18. 
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Ontario and some other provinces. The Sophonow Inquiry took a bolder 
approach and recommended a general rule that jailhouse informers not 
be allowed to testify, a recommendation the Lamer Inquiry also 
approved.187 The Supreme Court has, however, not followed this 
recommendation and has allowed jailhouse informers to testify without 
even a mandatory rule that warnings about their unreliability be given.188 
In a subsequent case, however, the Court allowed new evidence that was 
inconsistent with a jailhouse informer’s testimony to be introduced 
under its fairly liberal approach to the admission of new evidence.189 As 
in the false confession and identification contexts, the Supreme Court 
has been reluctant to exclude evidence, even though evidence from 
jailhouse informers has, in the past, contributed to wrongful convictions. 
G. Defence Lawyers and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Ineffective assistance of counsel can also play a role in wrongful 
convictions. The Marshall Commission criticized Marshall’s lawyers for 
not requesting disclosure or conducting their own investigations. The 
Goudge Inquiry into forensic pediatric pathology stressed the need for 
lawyers to be adequately trained and funded to deal with complex issues 
of forensic pediatric pathology. Guilty pleas were entered in many of the 
cases involving Dr. Smith, the defence in those cases may not have been 
prepared to rebut the flawed forensic pathology evidence offered by the 
state, even though the accused maintained their innocence.190 These 
cases, and other cases involving wrongful convictions arising out of 
guilty pleas,191 raise issues of whether it is competent and ethical for a 
defence lawyer to enter a guilty plea on behalf of a client who maintains 
his or her innocence, so as to receive a lighter sentence than will be 
imposed should the client be convicted after the completion of a trial. 
 
 187. SOPHONOW INQUIRY, supra note 6; LAMER INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 22. 
 188. Brooks, 2000 SCC 11. The Court did, however, provide subsequent guidance about the 
ability of trial judges to give warnings about why some forms of testimony should receive special 
scrutiny and why it may be dangerous to convict on the basis of such unconfirmed testimony. R. v. 
Khela, 2009 SCC 4, ¶ 37. 
 189. Hurley, 2010 SCC 18. 
 190. For an example of an early case where Dr Smith testified but the accused was acquitted after 
a middle class family mortgaged its home and put on a defence containing multiple experts from around 
the world, see R. v. M(S.), 1991 O.J. 1383 (Can.) (discussed in the GOUDGE REPORT, supra note 6, at 
12). 
 191. Hanemaayer, 2008 ONCA 580. Note that there is increasing recognition in the United States 
of wrongful convictions arising from guilty pleas. See SAMUEL GROSS AND MICHAEL SHAFFER, 
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989-2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS 8 (2012) available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ 
exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf (8% of 873 recorded exonerations between 1989 and 2012 
involving guilty pleas). 
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They also raise questions about the dangers of leaving the acceptance of 
guilty pleas to the discretion of trial judges. There are no special rules in 
Canada to limit the ability of trial judges to accept guilty pleas from 
those who maintain innocence or to require the judge to conduct a more 
searching examination of the factual basis of the guilty plea.192 
Ineffective assistance of counsel combined with judicial passivity in 
accepting guilty pleas dramatically increases the risk of wrongful 
convictions.193 
In R. v. G.D.B.,194 the Supreme Court recognized that the right to 
effective assistance of counsel was a principle of fundamental justice 
protected under s.7 of the Charter. The Court held that this right would 
only be violated if counsel’s conduct was unreasonable and incompetent 
and if the conduct resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Court 
followed the oft-criticized United States Supreme Court decision of 
Strickland v. Washington.195 Following that decision, there is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct is reasonable. Moreover, the court 
will not even determine the reasonableness of defence counsel’s conduct 
unless the accused can demonstrate that the alleged incompetence 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Court added, “miscarriages of 
justice may take many forms in this context. In some instances, 
counsel’s performance may have resulted in procedural unfairness. In 
others, the reliability of the trial’s result may have been 
compromised.”196 In the result, the Court found that counsel had made a 
tactical decision not to use a tape where the complainant stated the 
accused had not sexually abused her. The Court held that the defence 
counsel’s failure to use the tape did not affect the reliability of the 
conviction. Canadian accused have not enjoyed much success in 
subsequent claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.197 
H. Forensic and Other Expert Evidence 
A number of wrongful convictions in Canada have been caused by 
 
 192. The leading Supreme Court precedent, rendered long before the recognition of wrongful 
convictions, maintains that trial judges have discretion whether to accept guilty pleas over a strong 
dissent by Laskin J. that trial judges should determine the factual basis and voluntariness of the guilty 
plea. Adgey v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 426 (Can.). 
 193. For a very disturbing example where the Supreme Court accepted a guilty plea to non-capital 
murder in a case where the defence lawyers at trial maintained that he did not understand the mind of 
the Aboriginal accused, see Brosseau v. The Queen, [1969] S.C.R. 181 (Can.). 
 194. 2000 SCC 22. 
 195. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 196. R. v. G.D.B. 2000 SCC 22, ¶ 28. 
 197. Dale E.  Ives, The ‘Canadian’ Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 42 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 239 (2003). 
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faulty forensic evidence.198 There are two main ways to respond to such 
dangers. One is by reforming the production of the state’s forensic 
evidence. The other is for the courts to take steps to ensure that the 
forensic evidence used in the trial is reliable.199 
The Commission of Inquiry into Proceedings against Guy Paul Morin 
in its 1998 report found that Ontario’s Centre for Forensic Science had 
made numerous mistakes in the production of hair and fibre evidence 
that purported to link Morin to a murder before his DNA exoneration. 
Before the inquiry, Crown prosecutors had assumed that the Centre was 
infallible. The Commission, however, found problems in contamination 
of evidence and the misuse of published research.200 The Centre for 
Forensic Science, which is the central crime laboratory in the province 
of Ontario, undertook many reforms in response to the findings and 
recommendations of the Morin inquiry.201 A decade later, a similar 
inquiry was held in the neighbouring province of Manitoba when hair 
comparison evidence was again refuted by DNA testing. The Manitoba 
Inquiry heard that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police labs had stopped 
conducting hair comparison evidence in light of more advanced DNA 
testing, but stopped short of recommending that such hair comparison 
evidence be inadmissible. It also did not recommend that the crime 
laboratories be separated from the police. Finally, it suggested that it did 
not have jurisdiction to order a national audit of cases that relied on hair 
comparison evidence, even though the province of Manitoba had 
conducted such an inquiry.202 
Many of the same themes found in the Morin inquiry, which focused 
on hair and fibre comparison evidence, re-emerged a decade later when 
the Ontario Commission of Inquiry into Forensic Pediatric Pathology 
(the Goudge Inquiry) recommended similar reforms to the practice of 
forensic pathology. The Goudge Inquiry found problems in the lack of 
forensic training of pathologists, including Dr. Smith, and a lack of 
supervision of his work and testimony. Medical doctors who were 
supposed to supervise Dr. Smith did not have the adequate training in 
 
 198. See generally BIBI SANGHA, ET AL. FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF 
JUSTICE 241–322 (2010). 
 199. For an evaluation of the balance between these two mechanisms, see Gary Edmond & Kent 
Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic and Medical Evidence, 61 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 343 (2011). 
 200. MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6 , at117-118. 
 201. Jeffrey Manishen, Wrongful Convictions, Lessons Learned: The Canadian Experience, 13 J. 
CLINICAL FORENSIC MEDICINE 296 (2006) (the reforms included post-conviction DNA testing of hair 
“matches,” recording of preliminary reports, increased training, new protocols for reports and 
complaints, documentation of contamination, monitoring of courtroom testimony and the creation of an 
advisory board and a quality assurance unit). 
 202. DRISKELL INQUIRY, supra note 6 , at 174-185. 
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forensic pathology to do so. The Goudge Inquiry stopped short of 
recommending that Ontario move from a coroner’s system to one where 
forensic pathologists were fully responsible for death investigations. 
Subsequent to that inquiry, the chief forensic pathologist was given 
increased funds and powers to supervise the conduct of forensic 
autopsies and reports. These reforms included the creation of an 
oversight counsel and the maintenance of a registry of qualified forensic 
pathologists.203 The follow up to this Commission demonstrates that 
forensic pathology can be reformed within a coroner’s system. At the 
same time, it is unfortunate that those who allowed Dr. Smith to provide 
unreliable expert evidence ignored many of the earlier recommendations 
of the Morin Inquiry with respect to report writing, quality assurance, 
and the monitoring of court-room testimony. The fragmented nature of 
the forensic sciences presents a danger that they will only be 
incrementally reformed on a discipline-by-discipline, jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction basis in response to notorious wrongful convictions.204 
Both the Morin and Goudge Inquiries recommended that trial judges 
should be more vigilant in excluding expert evidence that does not 
satisfy threshold reliability standards, regardless of whether the science 
could be characterized as novel or not. The Goudge Inquiry also 
emphasized that experts should not be allowed to testify outside of their 
area of recognized expertise.205 It stopped short, however, of 
recommending that the state’s expert evidence should, consistent with 
criminal justice values, be held to a higher standard of demonstrable 
reliability.206 Canadian courts apply tests for expert evidence that are 
influenced by Daubert.207 They have moved away from admissibility 
tests that focused on general acceptance and whether experts have 
special knowledge through education or experience, to tests that require 
 
 203. Act to amend the Coroner’s Act S.O. 2009 c.15. 
 204. Kent Roach, Forensic Science and Miscarriages of Justice: Some Lessons from Comparative 
Experience, 50 JURIMETRICS 67 (2009). 
 205. For a troubling case involving the multidisciplinary child abuse and neglect team that Dr. 
Charles Smith worked with and in which the Supreme Court deferred to a trial judge’s decision to allow 
a burn expert to testify about child abuse and a child abuse expert to testify about burns see R. v. 
Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223. For critical discussion see GOUDGE INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 473–74. 
 206. As proposed in Gary Edmond, Pathological Science? Demonstrable Reliability and Expert 
Forensic Pathology Evidence, in PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (Roach 
ed., 2008); see also Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the 
State’s Forensic and Medical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 343 (2011). This proposal has drawn 
criticism on the basis that it would be unfair to impose a higher burden on the prosecutor and that the 
reasonable doubt standard for conviction adequately controls for the reliability of forensic evidence. See 
Kenneth Chasse, Junk Science by Way of a Higher Burden of Proof, 16 CAN. CRIM. L.Rev. 323; Nayha 
Acharya, Law’s Treatment of Science: From Idealization to Understanding, 36 Dal. L.J. 57 (2013). For 
our replies see Gary Edmond and Kent Roach, Comment, 16 CAN. CRIM. L.Rev. 357 (2012); Gary 
Edmond and Kent Roach, Trial by Theory, 36 Dal. L.J. 57 (2013). 
 207. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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that the expert opinion evidence be necessary in assisting the trier of fact 
and that it be subject to peer review and testing.208 The Supreme Court 
has stressed that science that might be accepted in a clinical setting to 
treat a patient, may have too high an error rate to justify its use as 
forensic evidence in criminal proceedings.209 There is a new emphasis in 
Canada on ‘evidence’ as opposed to ‘experience’ based expert scientific 
opinion. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in the 2007 Stephen Truscott 
appeal, for example, disregarded two opinions offered by a forensic 
pathologist and an entomology expert about the time of death because 
they were only based on the admittedly considerable experience of the 
Crown’s experts and did not engage with the scientific literature.210 
In 2007, the Supreme Court in a 4–3 decision in R. v. Trochym, 
excluded post-hypnosis testimony of a witness who purported to provide 
eyewitness identification.211 The majority stressed the importance of 
determining the threshold reliability of the evidence and started its 
judgment by noting that recent wrongful convictions had confirmed “the 
need to carefully scrutinize evidence presented against an accused for 
reliability and prejudicial effect, and to ensure the basic fairness of the 
criminal process.”212 In deciding that post-hypnosis testimony should be 
excluded, the Court was not deterred by the fact that it had been 
accepted in previous cases and might not be characterized as novel 
science, noting that “the admissibility of scientific evidence is not frozen 
in time.”213 The court stressed that what was ‘most troubling’ about 
post-hypnosis evidence was: 
[T]he potential rate of error in the additional information obtained 
through hypnosis when it is used for forensic purposes. At the present 
time, there is no way of knowing whether such information will be 
accurate or inaccurate. Such uncertainty is unacceptable in a court of 
law.214 
The majority of the Supreme Court in Trochym demonstrated an 
appropriate concern about the risk of wrongful convictions and the risk 
of relying on evidence of unknown reliability. This decision could 
potentially lead to the exclusion or qualification of expert evidence 
provided by experience based forensic sciences, especially those based 
on comparisons and pattern recognition. The Goudge Inquiry 
 
 208. R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 at 19; R. v. L.-J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600 (excluding various 
forms of novel science offered by the accused). 
 209. R. v. L.-J. [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600. 
 210. Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA at 165–69, 313–14. 
 211. [2007] 1 S.C.R. 239. 
 212. Id. at 1. 
 213. Id. at 31. 
 214. Id. at 55. 
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recommended that trial judges should, following Trochym, determine 
the threshold reliability of expert forensic evidence and that legal aid 
funding and training of defence counsel and judges be increased to 
achieve this objective.215 
In a more recent case, the Ontario Court of Appeal has affirmed that 
trial judges have discretion to exclude expert evidence that otherwise 
satisfies the criteria for admissibility because of concerns about its 
threshold reliability and possible prejudicial effect. Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred by excluding 
evidence the prosecution offered from a sociologist about the meaning 
of a tear drop tattoo on an accused charged with a gang-related murder. 
The Court of Appeal stressed that the trial judge’s concerns about the 
unknown error rate and lack of a random sample for the sociologist’s 
research was inappropriate given the nature of sociology. At the same 
time, the Court of Appeal regulated the content of the expert evidence 
by prohibiting the expert from testifying that the tattoo meant the 
accused killed someone. The accused was, however, subsequently 
convicted of first degree murder after the sociologist testified that the 
tattoo meant either that he had either killed someone or someone close 
to the accused had died when they had not.216 A critical question is 
whether similar concerns about the impossibility of determining precise 
error rates will allow forensic sciences to continue to be used in the 
absence of basic research on the validity of the experience based 
opinions drawn by fingerprint and handwriting analysts. If this occurs, 
judicial admissibility decisions will not provide a strong incentive to 
reform the forensic sciences. Much will depend on the steps that various 
provinces and laboratories take to ensure the reliability and quality of 
forensic evidence the prosecution offers. 
I. Judges and Juries 
Judges are appointed and not elected in Canada. As in the Marshall 
case, the decisions of trial judges to admit or exclude evidence can play 
an important role in wrongful convictions. The Supreme Court has 
 
 215. GOUDGE INQUIRY, supra note 6, chs. 17-18. 
 216. R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624; see Man convicted 4 years after acquittal, TORONTO STAR, 
Mar. 29, 2011. For criticisms of the Court of Appeal’s approach in Abbey and arguments that the expert 
evidence did not satisfy the necessity standard for admissibility see Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A 
Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic and Medical Evidence, 61 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 343, 392-396. For findings that cases such as Abbey are not unusual and that courts in 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all been reluctant to exclude expert 
evidence because of reliability concerns see Gary Edmond, et al., Admissibility compared: The reception 
of incriminating expert opinion (i.e., forensic science) evidence in four adversarial jurisdictions, U 
Denv. Crim. L. Rev (forthcoming).  
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deferred to the discretion of trial judges to admit expert evidence, even 
when experts may have strayed from their area of expertise.217 More 
recently, it has indicated that trial judges should be more active in 
determining the threshold reliability of evidence, including expert 
evidence.218 Trial judges should help ensure that qualified experts are 
not allowed to give evidence outside of the realm of expertise. 
Restrictions on the admissibility of expert evidence can, however, work 
to the disadvantage of the accused who may be wrongfully convicted. 
Canadian courts remain reluctant to allow the accused to call expert 
evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification219 or false 
confessions.220 One of the reasons why Tammy Marquardt faced the 
possibility of a new trial was that the Court of Appeal discounted 
testimony by neurologists that her son may have died from an epileptic 
seizure because of the limits of their expertise.221 
Trial judges have much discretion in deciding whether to accept a 
guilty plea. In light of recent wrongful convictions that have been 
revealed after guilty pleas, trial judges should be more active in 
determining whether there is a factual basis for a guilty plea. The 
National Judicial Institute of Canada provides an intense three day 
training session for trial judges on the causes and dangers of wrongful 
convictions. Judges have also made creative decisions in allowing 
possible victims of wrongful convictions to be released on bail pending 
the Minister of Justice’s decision to re-open their case after appeals have 
been exhausted.222 
Public inquiries have been reluctant to criticize juries for the role they 
have played in wrongful convictions. Although juries are used 
infrequently in Canadian criminal cases, they are mandatory in murder 
cases, unless the accused and the prosecutor both agree to a bench trial. 
The jury that convicted Donald Marshall Jr. was all white and was not 
screened for possible bias against Marshall because he was Aboriginal. 
Moreover, one of the jurors subsequently explained the guilty verdict on 
the basis of racist stereotypes about both Marshall and the African-
Canadian victim. Canadian courts now allow potential jurors to be 
 
 217. R. v. Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223 (allowing child abuse experts to testify about burns and 
burn experts to testify about child abuse). The Goudge Commission noted some of the dangers of this 
approach and that the Court now takes a more rigorous approach to the admissibility of expert evidence. 
GOUDGE INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 473–74. 
 218. R. v. Trochym, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 239. 
 219. R. v. McIntosh, (1997) 117 C.C.C.(3d) 385 (Ont.C.A.); R. v. Woodard, 2009 MBCA 42. 
 220. Re Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202. 
 221. R. v. Marquardt, 2011 ONCA 281 at ¶ 21. 
 222. R. v. Phillion, [2003] O.J. No. 3422 (Ont. Sup. Ct. of Just.); R. v. Driskell, 2004 MBQB 3; 
R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB 238; Ostrowski v. The Queen et al., 2009 MBQB 327 (Can.). 
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questioned about possible racist bias.223 Canadian courts, however, 
carefully regulate the questions that can be put to prospective jurors. 
Tammy Marquardt was not allowed to question prospective jurors about 
whether they would be biased against her because she was charged (and 
wrongfully convicted) of killing her young child.224 The Supreme Court 
has upheld the absolute secrecy of jury deliberations even in the face of 
allegations of racist statements from jury members.225 The role of juries 
in wrongful convictions, especially those involving accused from 
minority communities and allegations of horrific crimes, remains an 
important but understudied topic. This is especially so given the 
Supreme Court’s clear statements that appellate courts should defer to 
convictions entered by juries, especially those based on credibility 
determinations.226 
The Marshall commission criticized the appeal court that heard 
Marshall’s first appeal for not examining legal errors the trial judge 
made that were apparent in the transcripts but that Marshall’s lawyers 
did not argue on appeal. It recommended that appeal courts be more 
proactive with respect to errors that might contribute to wrongful 
convictions.227 This raises interesting questions about the balance 
between adversarial approaches that rely on party presentation of the 
issues and more judge-centred inquisitorial approaches. Appeal courts 
also have the power to appoint commissioners to gather new evidence to 
assist on appeals. Although such inquiries have been conducted in at 
least one wrongful conviction case,228 the appointment of such 
commissioners are rare. Appeal courts also have the power to appoint 
publicly funded counsel to assist with appeals. 
Canada has a unitary court system that in most cases only allows the 
accused one appeal as of right and does not allow collateral challenge by 
way of habeas corpus. The Canadian system allows much less scope for 
successive challenges than the American system. This approach is, 
however, mitigated by the fact that Canadian courts appear to be more 
willing to entertain appeals out of time and to admit fresh evidence on 
appeal than most American courts. A related factor is that unelected 
Canadian prosecutors more frequently consent to measures to correct 
wrongful convictions than their American counterparts.229 
 
 223. R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 
 224. R. v. Find, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863. 
 225. R. v. Pan, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344. 
 226. R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 22. 
 227. MARSHALL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 87. 
 228. R. v. Neepose, 1992 ABCA 77. 
 229. Kent Roach, Less Procedure, More Justice? A Comparison of Canadian and American 
Wrongful Convictions, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: CAUSES AND 
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At the same time, the Canadian appeal system has frequently failed to 
detect wrongful convictions. For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
dismissed William Mullins-Johnson’s appeal from his wrongful 
conviction for the murder and sexual assault of his four-year-old niece. 
The majority of the court held that the trial judge had adequately 
instructed the jury about the accused’s defence that no crime had been 
committed. Borins, J.A., however, dissented on the basis that the trial 
judge did not adequately instruct the jury about the weakness of the 
evidence that the child victim had been sexually assaulted.230 The 
Supreme Court, sitting only as five judges, dismissed Mullins-Johnson’s 
subsequent appeal after an oral hearing but without bothering to provide 
written reasons.231 In hindsight, the appeal process failed to prevent a 
wrongful conviction that was only reversed after the Minister of Justice 
ordered a new appeal on the basis of new pathology evidence that 
suggested that a sexual assault did not occur and that the cause of the 
victim’s death was unascertained.232 
The Supreme Court of Canada has been more sympathetic to the 
danger of wrongful convictions than the United States Supreme Court. 
The Canadian Court’s two most important decisions with respect to 
wrongful convictions was its recognition of a broad constitutional right 
to disclosure in the 1991 case of R. v. Stinchcombe233 and its 2001 
decision holding that the risk of wrongful convictions would now 
require Canada to seek assurances that the death penalty would not be 
applied before extraditing fugitives.234 Its 2007 decision excluding post-
hypnosis testimony because of its unknown reliability235 also has 
promise in minimizing the risk of wrongful convictions from unreliable 
evidence. The Court has also recognized the ability of people to bring 
civil suits with respect to malicious prosecution236 and negligent police 
investigation.237 
The Supreme Court’s performance on other issues, especially those 
relating to the admissibility of evidence that may be unreliable, has been 
less robust. It has neither prohibited nor even required mandatory 
warnings about testimony from jailhouse informers despite their 
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frequent use in wrongful conviction cases.238 It has adopted a strict test 
for ineffective assistance of counsel without apparent recognition that a 
very similar test has been widely criticized in the United States.239 It has 
allowed in-dock identifications to continue, even while conceding the 
minimal probative value of such judicial “show-up” identifications.240 
The Court has rejected the idea that convictions should be overturned 
because the appellate court has a lurking doubt about guilt and stressed 
the need to defer to convictions entered by juries;241 it has allowed 
prejudicial investigative hearsay to be used to counter claims that police 
investigations are tainted by tunnel vision;242 it has restricted the 
admission of evidence of third parties who may be responsible for 
crimes;243 it has allowed confessions to be admitted after intense 
interrogations despite the dangers of false confessions;244 and it has not 
prevented intense Mr. Big stings despite the risk that they may result in 
false confessions.245 
There is also a danger that the federal Parliament has deferred to 
uneven judicial regulation of police practices such as identification and 
interrogation procedures even though legislative regulation would be 
more comprehensive and likely more effective in changing police and 
prosecutorial conduct.246 Parliament has rejected a number of reforms 
proposed by provincial inquiries to decrease the risks of wrongful 
convictions. For example, it has refused to follow the recommendations 
of six inquiries that the petition procedure to the federal Minister of 
Justice be replaced by applications to an independent commission with 
investigative powers. In recent years, Parliament has almost uniformly 
pursued “tough on crime” and “victims rights” agendas and has 
demonstrated little concern about wrongful convictions. Indeed, its 
record is worse than that of the American Congress that has enacted 
some measures to facilitate DNA evidence retention and testing. 
Parliament’s record is also worse than the record of some state 
legislatures that have enacted reforms in response to wrongful 
convictions, including the creation of the North Carolina Innocence 
Inquiry Commission to respond to claims of factual innocence and 
various state laws to regulate police identification procedures.247  
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VI. COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
The lack of a legislative response in Canada to wrongful convictions 
is also seen with respect to compensation. Canada, unlike many 
American states and the United Kingdom, does not have legislation 
designed to implement the requirement under Article 14(6) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to provide 
compensation for victims of miscarriage of justice. In an attempt to 
discharge this mandate, Canadian federal and provincial governments 
issued guidelines in 1988 to provide for compensation. Unfortunately, 
these guidelines are quite restrictive and require statements either from 
an appellate court or from the executive in a free pardon that the person 
seeking compensation did not commit the crime. The guidelines exclude 
compensation for family members of the wrongfully convicted. They 
limit compensation for non-pecuniary losses to $100,000.248 They allow 
reductions on pecuniary loss of earnings on the basis of “benefits 
received while incarcerated” and lack of due diligence or “blameworthy 
conduct or other acts on the part of the applicant which contributed to 
the wrongful conviction.”249 
Fortunately, most voluntary awards of compensation have not 
followed the restrictions in the federal-provincial guidelines. For 
example, awards have included compensation for family members 
adversely affected by wrongful convictions and damages for non-
pecuniary damages well in excess of the $100,000 cap. The highest 
amount of compensation has been $10 million to David Milgaard who 
spent 23 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Thomas 
Sophonow and Clayton Johnson each received $2.5 million. The Ontario 
government recently awarded Stephen Truscott $6.5 million after his 
1959 murder conviction was overturned and the Ontario Court of 
Appeal acquitted him in 2007. Compensation was paid even though the 
Court of Appeal did not declare Truscott factually innocent and 
subsequently held that it did not have jurisdiction to make such findings. 
In addition, Mr. Truscott’s wife, who suffered with him for the 38 years 
he was on parole and lived under an assumed identity, received 
$100,000. A retired judge who recommended this award to the 
government suggested that the ex gratia payment was justified even 
though Mr. Truscott would likely not be able to establish fault at a civil 
trial and his factual innocence could not be established in the absence of 
 
Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 Albany L.Rev. 1301 (2011).  
 248. This cap is based on a 1978 judicial cap on non-pecuniary damages in physical injury cases. 
Andrews v. Grand and Toy, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229. 
 249. FEDERAL PROVINCIAL GUIDELINES—COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND 
IMPRISONED PERSONS (1988). These guidelines have been under review by governments for a number 
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DNA. He also observed that “many if not most of the awards of 
compensation”250 made in the last 20 years have departed from the 
restrictive federal provincial guidelines. 
Although some compensation payments paid to victims of wrongful 
convictions in Canada are generous, others are not. Donald Marshall 
only received about $250,000 for 10 years of imprisonment, but this was 
increased after a public inquiry exonerated him. Almost thirty years 
later, the Ontario government offered Tammy Marquardt the same 
modest sum despite her 13 years of imprisonment. Such an offer of 
compensation to Marquardt is difficult to justify, especially because the 
same government compensated William Mullins-Johnson, who served 
12 years in prison, with a $4.25 million settlement and both Marquardt 
and Mullins-Johnson were wrongfully convicted on the basis of Dr. 
Smith’s flawed forensic pathology testimony.251 No compensation has 
been offered to others such as Romeo Phillion and Kyle Unger on the 
basis that they made false confessions. 
Under the Canadian system, a person who brings a civil action will be 
responsible for the other side’s legal costs if they are unsuccessful. The 
prospect of such adverse costs awards, along with delays in civil 
litigation, may deter those who are wrongfully convicted from suing the 
state even if they have lawyers prepared to work pro bono or on a 
contingency basis. Canadian courts have imposed their own caps on 
non-pecuniary damages, such as pain and suffering and loss of family 
time.252 Civil litigation brought by the wrongly convicted has 
encountered problems based on statutes of limitation,253 a reluctance to 
recognize a cause of action for negligent as distinct from malicious 
prosecution,254 and the imposition of qualified immunity doctrines when 
damages are sought for violation of constitutional rights under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.255 All of these factors help 
explain why most compensation cases are resolved out of court. One 
notable exception is the case of Rejean Hinse who, in 1961, was 
wrongfully convicted of robbery. In 1997, the Supreme Court finally 
acquitted him. Represented by counsel acting pro-bono he obtained an 
$8.6 million award against the federal government in 2011, 50 years 
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after his wrongful conviction.256 The enactment of legislation or 
compulsory guidelines to govern compensation in Canada might reduce 
the disparity in awards, but also likely lead to less generous payments in 
the most egregious cases. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Essay has provided an overview of wrongful convictions in 
Canada. There has been increasing recognition of wrongful convictions 
over the last 20 years, but the precise number of wrongful convictions in 
Canada remains elusive given ambiguities about what counts as a 
wrongful conviction. As in the United States, most acknowledged 
wrongful convictions are found in homicide and sexual assault cases. It 
is impossible to know how many undetected wrongful convictions have 
occurred in other types of cases, including cases where the accused has 
pled guilty. An increasing number of wrongful convictions have been 
recognized in Canada in the last five years where the accused pled 
guilty, often to avoid a harsher sentence. These cases support the idea 
that recognized wrongful convictions are only the tip of the iceberg 
because they reveal that wrongful convictions can occur in the vast 
majority of criminal cases where the accused makes a seemingly 
voluntary decision to plead guilty. Even very low error rates would 
produce significant number of wrongful convictions given the number 
of convictions. 
There are two main ways that old convictions are overturned in 
Canada, namely appeals out of time or a petition to the Minister of 
Justice. In practice, fresh evidence is generally necessary for either 
mechanism to be successful. Canadian courts do not strictly enforce 
time limits for appeals or the discovery of fresh evidence. In the guilty 
plea and other cases, Canadian courts have allowed out of time appeals, 
sometimes with the consent of the prosecution, and have overturned 
convictions after appeal courts have considered the new evidence. 
Canadian prosecutors, who are not elected, have frequently consented to 
appeals out of time, the admission of fresh evidence, and the overturning 
of wrongful convictions. 
In cases where appeals have been exhausted, a petition to the federal 
Minister of Justice must be made and that elected politician can order a 
 
 256. Hinse v. Quebec, 2011 QCCS 1780. Hinse also sued the provincial Quebec government but 
they settled out of court for $4.5 million. The case is also significant because in 1997 Hinse persuaded 
the Supreme Court to enter an acquittal in his case, reversing a stay of proceedings originally ordered 
when his 1964 conviction was overturned in 1991 after he had served five years in jail and ten years on 
parole. R. v. Hinse, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597; R. v. Hinse, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 3; Quebec man wins largest award 
for wrongful conviction, GLOBE & MAIL Apr. 15, 2011. 
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new trial or a new appeal if he or she concludes that a miscarriage of 
justice likely occurred. In cases where the Minister has ordered a new 
trial, prosecutors often stay or withdraw charges given the age of the 
case, but such actions deprive the previously convicted person of an 
acquittal, let alone a finding of innocence which is generally necessary 
for compensation. In cases where the Minister orders a new appeal, 
appeal courts consider the fresh evidence and decide whether the 
conviction now constitutes a miscarriage of justice defined to include 
both the conviction of the innocent, unfair trials, and unsafe convictions. 
Appeal courts, however, do not make determinations of factual 
innocence. In some cases, the appeal court will order a new trial and in 
other cases the appeal court will enter an acquittal. 
The willingness of Canadian courts to accept fresh evidence without 
undue emphasis on whether the accused could have obtained the 
evidence at trial and their willingness to grant bail to free suspected 
victims of wrongful convictions pending an appeal, or even pending the 
Minister of Justice’s petition decision, are two of the greatest strengths 
of the Canadian system in responding to wrongful convictions. At the 
same time, relatively few people apply to the Minister of Justice to re-
open cases. Since 2002, the Minister has ordered new trials or appeals in 
15% of all applications. In all but one of these thirteen cases, the result 
has been the undoing of the conviction either through the court entering 
an acquittal or prosecutors withdrawing or staying the charges. This 
suggests that the Minister of Justice only grants remedies in cases where 
there is compelling new evidence that the previously convicted person is 
not guilty. 
The seven public inquiries held in the last 20 years have examined the 
causes of wrongful convictions. They include police error, including 
tunnel vision; inaccurate eyewitness identifications sometimes 
facilitated by improper identification techniques and feedback; false 
confessions sometimes facilitated by improper police interrogations; the 
use of unreliable witnesses, especially jailhouse informers; lack of full 
disclosure by the prosecutor; inadequate defence assistance; and faulty 
forensic evidence. 
Canada has taken some steps to remedy these causes of wrongful 
convictions. The Supreme Court declared a broad constitutional right to 
the disclosure of all relevant and non-privileged evidence held by the 
prosecutor in recognition that non-disclosure had caused wrongful 
convictions. It also declared that the risk of wrongful convictions in all 
justice systems make it unsafe to extradite a fugitive without assurances 
that the death penalty will not be applied. Some provinces have 
responded to wrongful convictions by improving the identification 
procedures used by the police and the practice of forensic sciences. 
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Some provinces have even conducted pro-active audits in cases 
involving suspect forms of evidence to determine the existence of 
wrongful convictions.  
At the same time, there is much work to be done to lessen the risk of 
wrongful convictions in Canada and to improve remedies for the 
wrongly convicted. The federal Parliament has refused to exercise its 
exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure to regulate 
identification and interrogation procedures to minimize the risk of false 
identifications and false confessions. In turn, the courts have often been 
unwilling to exclude evidence even when the police used techniques 
associated with false identifications and false confessions. The appellate 
courts have refused to overturn convictions when they have a lurking 
doubt about guilt. The federal Parliament has also refused to follow the 
recommendations of six public inquiries that the federal Minister of 
Justice’s powers to order new trials or appeals be given to an 
independent commission that could take a more proactive approach to 
the investigation of suspected wrongful convictions. Parliament also has 
not legislated a procedure to allow the wrongly convicted to obtain 
compensation. The wrongly convicted must demonstrate factual 
innocence in order to obtain compensation under restrictive 
administrative guidelines, but Canadian courts refuse to make 
determinations of factual innocence. 
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